

Streetcars and Popular Protest in Rio de Janeiro: The Case of the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company, 1903-1920

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ABSTRACT

In the first decade of this century, a Canadian utilities company purchased and modernized Rio de Janeiro's streetcar system. The company's aim for efficiency over equity of service incited popular, sometimes violent, opposition. Although petition and riot secured advantages for the riding public, I argue that popular opposition was a relatively ineffective regulator of streetcar services. Before 1920, the streetcar company, and increasingly the municipal government, triumphed in the contest for control of Rio de Janeiro's mass transit system.

INTRODUCTION

For the young republics of Latin America, the latter half of the nineteenth century was the dawn of "modernization." Although the term has become value-laden, particularly with liberal notions of economic development, in essence, modernization meant primarily the adoption of foreign capital, technology and ideas (Burns 1979; Henderson 1993). Until the First World War, the British were the principal investors in Latin America and funneled their resources into agricultural commodities, mines, railroads, and other utility schemes (Manchester 1933; Graham 1968). Increased trade and integration of Latin America into the Atlantic economy stimulated and accelerated the transfer of European and North American capital, technology, philosophy, and fashion. Few corners of Latin America were untouched by the effects of modernization, though its influence was concentrated in the rapidly growing cities (Scobie 1986).

The consequences of foreign penetration in Latin America have stimulated much debate in the literature, particularly concerning the ideas of dependency. It is not my intention here, however, to expand on the dependency debate, but rather to demonstrate a particular response to modernization.¹ In this study, I examine popular opposition to the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company (commonly called the "Light"), a Canadian enterprise backed primarily by British investors, and its streetcar services in Rio de Janeiro. I show that both riot and petition were effective means of lowering streetcar fares. However, I argue that the Light's concessions to the riding public were relatively minor. Until 1920, the Light won the battle for control of the city's streetcar services. Although on two occasions the riding public forced the company to reduce fares, the Light still managed to make healthy profits. Only after the First World War did profits begin to decline; such a change in fortune was not, however, the result of a hostile riding public, [end p. 49] but rather that of a restrictive municipal government. Local politicians, with the assistance of professional bureaucrats, increasingly constrained the desires of private enterprise in the first two decades of this century. Popular opposition was a relatively ineffective regulator of streetcar services in Rio de Janeiro before 1920. The Light's streetcar network was regulated by a contract negotiated between the company, municipal council, and federal prefecture.

In this paper I first provide a brief summary of the Light and its negotiations for the contract; second, study the operation of the contract, focusing on popular opposition to the streetcar services; and finally, consider the changing relationship between municipal government and the Light before and after the First World

War.

THE LIGHT AND THE UNIFICATION CONTRACT

In June 1904, William Mackenzie, the Canadian railway magnate, incorporated the Rio de Janeiro Light and Power Company and in May of the following year, the federal Minister of Transport and Public Works granted the company permission to operate in Brazil.² As one of the most prominent businessmen in Canada at the time, William Mackenzie managed to attract the interest and money of British, American and Canadian investors. By 1905, he and his associates had managed to organize \$25 million in stocks and \$25 million in bonds in order to carry out a grand utilities scheme in the Brazilian capital. In the first few years of its operation, the company purchased the gas and telephone companies, the streetcar franchises, and the right to provide electricity to the growing urban market.³ By 1908, the Light held a near monopoly on electricity generation and distribution, public lighting, telephone services, and streetcar services.⁴

Between 1905 and 1907, Alexander Mackenzie (no relation to William), the principal representative of the Light in Rio de Janeiro, negotiated with the municipal council for a contract to unify three of the five existing streetcar companies. By 1905, he had purchased the majority of shares of the Sao Cristóvão, Vila Isabel and Carris Urbanos streetcar companies which served the downtown and northern districts of the city. The other two companies, the Jardim Botânico and Carioca, served the wealthier clientele of the southern zone (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Streetcar lines of the five principal companies in Rio de Janeiro, 1906. Source: First annual report of the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company, 1907.

Mackenzie offered the city a unified, electric streetcar network for the areas served by the São Cristóvão, Vila Isabel and Carris Urbanos companies. He argued that it would improve the speed and efficiency of a system that was sorely in need of improvement. By 1892, the Jardim Botânico Company had electrified its system, demonstrating to *cariocas*⁵ the advantages of the new, clean and speedy mode of transit. Naturally, the municipal council was keen to have the most modern transit devices for its modernizing city. When Mackenzie approached the municipal council in 1905, it agreed to negotiate with the company.

Initially, the prospects for the company looked good. From the perspective of the municipal council, an improved streetcar system would cost the city nothing. The Light offered to convert the mule-drawn streetcar system to electric traction, to pay a generous annual sum to municipal coffers and to not increase fares. In exchange, the Light requested an exclusive 90-year concession which the municipal council was willing to consider. Mackenzie's warm welcome convinced him "without the slightest doubt" that the company would not have any difficulty getting what it wanted.⁶ [end p. 50]

Soon after negotiations began, however, Alexander Mackenzie encountered difficulties with the prefecture and municipal council. Prefect Pereira Passos was particularly suspicious of the Light and its intentions. Passos, who oversaw the famous urban reforms to Rio de Janeiro between 1902 and 1906,⁷ worried that the electric wires, double lines and heavy and large electric streetcars would worsen the traffic congestion in the center of the city.⁸ In addition, he believed that the company was not paying enough for the privilege of collecting fares from millions of passengers every year.⁹ Under the Passos administration, Alexander Mackenzie was not able to pass the contract in agreeable terms. It was only with the installment of a new prefect, General Souza Aguiar, that the Light managed to pass the unification contract, albeit in amended form. The terms of the contract were not what the company originally hoped for and, as explained below, Mackenzie made some errors in the negotiations that later cost the company a great deal of money. But by November 1907, the city and the Light had a unification contract which permitted the company to operate the São Cristóvão, Carris Urbanos and Vila Isabel as one, electrified system. The contract permitted the company to eliminate certain lines in order to avoid duplication of service. To coordinate a unified system, the contract also permitted the Light to alter the schedules of the streetcars of each of the franchises. In exchange for the concession, the Light was obliged to build certain lines to the suburbs, maintain unprofitable second-class fares on some lines at certain hours of the day, contribute large annual payments to the municipality, accept a shorter 70-year concession, and revert all streetcar infrastructure to the city on expiration of the contract.¹⁰

The riding public played little part in the negotiations for the contract. Despite the rhetoric of the municipal councilors and prefect who purported to represent the common people, the authorities used the negotiations as a means to fulfill their design goals for the city. These goals, for the most part, marginalized the poor and working class of Rio de Janeiro. For the municipal council and prefecture, the improved streetcar service (along with the existing railway) was the means to displace poor workers living in the centre to the northern periphery (Silva 1992; Padilha 1986; Hahner 1986). Among other aims, the Passos and subsequent reforms were designed to reclaim the central city as elite territory and valorize potentially valuable land in the core (Benchimol 1990; Bodstein 1986; Abreu 1987). An inexpensive streetcar system would permit the working class to travel to and from home in the northern suburbs and work in the downtown, where most employment was located (Keremitsis 1982, 51). The unification contract signed between the Light and municipal government considered of little import the real interests of the riding public of the unified streetcar companies. Only as the Light began to use the privileges written into the contract did the largely illiterate masses use their method for negotiation: public protest (Meade 1989).

THE CONTRACT IN OPERATION

Initially, there was relatively little popular opposition to the unification contract. Most riders knew nothing of the content of the contract and were unaware of its possible consequences on their daily lives. In the short term, the unification scheme promised to decrease the fares and to make travel around the city faster and easier than the existing system. No longer was it necessary to transfer from one company's streetcar to the next to travel from the neighbourhoods of Vila Isabel or São Cristóvão to downtown. With the promise of electric traction, the cars would also travel more quickly than the mule-drawn cars.¹¹ Already, many residents of São Cristóvão were going out of their way to take the streetcars of the Vila Isabel Company (which the former German owners began to electrify in 1905) because of "the exhilarating speed" at which

the electric cars traveled.¹² When the Light converted the Tijuca line to electric traction in 1907, the trip from Tijuca to downtown was decreased from two hours to one. After the installation of electric traction, the number of passengers increased 250 percent.¹³ As long as the fares were not affected, *cariocas* wanted the quickest and most modern means of transportation they could get. However, the public soon lost its trust in the company as the Light began to use the privileges of the contract.

The São Francisco de Paula Riots, 1909

Fourteen months after signing the contract, the Light manipulated the fares by altering the schedules, a decision which provoked some of the worst riots against the company. The trouble began when the [end p. 51] Light decided to introduce a "direct" line to downtown from São Cristóvão by avoiding the existing transfer point at the São Francisco de Paula Square (Figure 2). The official reason was to speed up traffic. In truth, the Light instituted the change to increase fares and revenues. Streetcar Companies - earn •• Urhanos - - Vila 1S



Figure 2. Streetcar lines in downtown Rio de Janeiro, 1906.
Source: ALRJ (Arquivo da Light S. A., Rio de Janeiro).

Under the unification contract, the Light was permitted to charge a fare of 200 réis (about 3.24 English pence) on "direct" routes. Passengers on direct streetcars traveled between the outlying districts and downtown without having to switch cars at a transfer point. Regardless of the distance they traveled on the direct streetcars, passengers had to pay 200 réis. Under the previous system, passengers paid only 100 réis to travel between the suburbs and the São Francisco de Paula Square. If they chose to, passengers could pay another 100 réis to travel between the square and downtown core. However, since the square is close to the core of the city (less than 1 kilometer to the XV de Novembro Square), many commuters saved their 100 réis and walked the remaining distance to their jobs downtown. Under the new schedule, passengers would be forced to pay 200 réis, regardless of how far they traveled.

Naturally, many riders opposed the plan. When the Light altered the schedule, the public turned out to protest. On 11 January, crowds gathered in the São Francisco de Paula Square to protest the "detestable streetcar service" of the Light and to denounce the route change.¹⁴ An 'ultimatum' delivered to the offices of the Light was read out loud to the crowd by Augusto Estruc, the organizer of the demonstration.¹⁵ Mr. Estruc declared that since the square was the "heart of the city of Rio de Janeiro" and that it was the traditional terminal point of the São Cristóvão Company that the Light would have to reinstate the terminal point. The organizer gave the Light eight days to respond to the petition. In effect, the Light did not get

more than a few minutes. Immediately following the meeting, angry mobs took to the streets, flipping, stoning and burning streetcars.¹⁶ Mounted police responded quickly and moved in to disperse the crowds and to escort the streetcars to the end of their lines. When they met resistance, as in the Praça 15 de Novembro, the police "slashed indiscriminately" at the crowd. Throughout the evening, crowds ran around the streets flipping and blockading streetcars and smashing street lamps until the army and police arrived. Large contingents of police guarded the offices of the Light and the offices of the São Cristóvão Company for fear of rioters' attacks. Realizing the magnitude of the riot, the Light suspended all traffic and did not resume service until after 10 p.m. with each streetcar guarded by two armed policemen.¹⁷

The following day, Fred Huntress (the General Manager of the Light) met with the police chief and resolved that 50 policemen would guard each streetcar barn and office of the Carris Urbanos, Vila Isabel, and São Cristóvão Companies and that each electric car of the Vila Isabel would travel with two armed policemen. The police chief stationed mounted police and infantry on all the major corners of the city in expectation of more disturbances. Again in the early evening, crowds met in the São Francisco Square. This time they met to protest against not only the Light but also against the police for their alleged brutal treatment of crowds the day before. From the square, the protestors marched to the Ministry of Justice and attempted to storm the building. The crowds chanted denunciations of the police and the Light until the Minister, Tavares de [end p. 52]Lyra, appeased the crowd by promising an inquiry into the behaviour of the police chief and his forces the day before. However, the protestors were not entirely satisfied with the promised inquiry. Throughout the evening, rioters flipped streetcars, smashed street lamps and battled with the police, forcing the Light to suspend streetcar traffic again. From 5 p. m. until the early hours of the next morning, police and rioters exchanged gun fire, killing three citizens and injuring a total of 31 people. For the following two nights, the Light suspended most streetcar traffic while police barricaded the streetcar companies' offices against the rioting mobs.¹⁸ On 14 January, after four days and three nights of riots, Augusto Estruc distributed a bulletin informing *cariocas* that the Light had agreed to "satisfy the wishes of the people" and that calm could return to the streets.¹⁹ The unrelenting protests forced the Light to agree to the conditions of the ultimatum and reinstate the terminal, with a transfer point at the São Francisco da Paula Square, and the 100 réis fare.

Alexander Mackenzie was obviously alarmed by the riots, though in a letter to a colleague in São Paulo he called the riots a "slight disturbance" and the damage to the company "insignificant." He blamed the disturbances on the merchants of São Francisco de Paula Square who he claimed had "hired a number of agitators and ruffians to create disorder in the streets." In regard to the alteration in the schedule, Mackenzie reported that "the authorities are entirely with us and no change is being made in what has been done."²⁰ However, three days earlier, the director of the Department of Works and Transport wrote to the Light pressing the company to consider the "possibility" of some streetcar lines going to the São Francisco de Paula Square.²¹ As Mackenzie explained to his colleague in the city of São Paulo, the re-routing of the cars was necessary because under the unification contract, the streetcars would circulate through the city with no terminal points within the city.²² In this case, however, the riots persuaded the Light not to execute the privileges of the unification contract.

Arbitration, 1915

Smashing and turning over streetcars was one means of effecting change. Literate passengers, as the following example indicates, could also use the dictates of the contract to work in favor of the riding public. In 1915, a petition from a resident of Tijuca led to the restoration of more first class 100 reis fares for the old São Cristóvão Company lines (Figure 1). The petitioner argued that under the unification contract, the Light was obliged to provide first class cars to Tijuca for 100 réis.²³ In response, C.A. Sylvester (Assistant General Manager of the Rio Light at this time) wrote to the prefecture that the São Cristóvão Company line

in question had not been a separate route since the unification plan of 1907 and that traffic to this area was carried on the Vila Isabel Company lines. Sylvester asked the prefecture "[W]hy then do you intend to reestablish the line which you took away?" He also argued that the issue of fares of the São Cristóvão Company had been dealt with in July 1909.²⁴ Prefect Correa responded that "the company must know that if the previous Prefect had the capacity to give this or that order about the case, the Prefect of today can also reform the order." He argued that as prefect, he could reestablish several lines if he chose to, so the appeal of the Light was turned down.²⁵ In a rather surprising decision, the prefecture ordered the Light to reestablish eight routes within 24 hours and to reinstate 100 réis first class fares or face hefty fines.²⁶ Huntress responded to the prefecture that it was ignoring the dispatches of earlier prefects and that the reestablishment of the lines would prejudice the interests of the company and the integrity of the unification contract. Backed into a corner, Huntress was forced to file for arbitration.²⁷

This contest the Light lost. After two months of hearings, the arbiters decided primarily in favor of the prefecture. They ordered the Light to reestablish four streetcar routes within a period decided upon by the prefecture and to maintain the 100 réis fare for first class cars. The company also had to increase the number of 100 réis cars by 30 percent.²⁸ On the side of the Light, the arbiters ruled that three of the seven lines in question would not have to be reestablished. Nevertheless, the company suffered a humiliating defeat. The arbiters ruled that by the contract, the Light could not suspend *any* pre-unification routes unless the lines were duplicated by the previously-independent streetcar companies. The Light's and Prefect Aguiar's interpretation of the unification contract in 1907 allowed the Light to close the São Cristóvão Company route to Tijuca because they judged that the Vila Isabel company [end p. 53] routes provided the same service. The petitioner, Prefect Corrêa, and arbiters thought otherwise. The Light was faced with the reality that favorable interpretations of the contract by earlier prefects friendly to the company could be easily overturned.²⁹

Schedules and Fare Increases, 1911

The Light did not lose all its battles with the riding public. In 1911, it managed effectively to increase its fares by a change in the schedule, as it had tried to do in 1909 with the old São Cristóvão routes. By placing more direct cars, with a fare of 200 réis, on the lines than sectional cars, with a fare of 100 réis, riders were forced to pay the higher passage or ride on crowded, less frequent cars. It also reduced the number of second class cars and the hours in which they ran. By the new schedule, approved by Prefect Carneiro Monteiro on 25 January and put into effect on 10 March, the Light sent out each day 2,059 direct streetcars charging 200 réis, 500 sectional streetcars charging 100 réis per section and 394 second-class cars charging 100 réis.³⁰ With the new schedule, the newspapers charged that "poor people" had to wait for 30 and more minutes for a 100 réis car which were "completely full" when they arrived.³¹ The editors of the *Jornal do Comércio* accused the "powerful Canadian company" of assaulting the "well being of the people that require to pay fares one and more times a day to go and come from the home to workplace to maintain their poor subsistence" and of exploiting the "working and humble class of the city which for very respectable economic motives, can only travel in streetcars of second class."³² The new schedule, the *Jornal do Comércio* argued, meant poorer service for the public while "all day long, 200 réis fares fall into the large purse of the Light."³³ The newspapers reported that some protestors flipped and burned streetcars and others refused to pay the 200 réis fare on some streetcars but, for the most part, the public accepted the new schedule peacefully.³⁴ Letters to the newspapers laid the blame for the new schedule not only on the Light but also on the prefecture. In one letter, the writer argued that Dr. Murão Valle (Department of Works and Transport) was "more at fault than the Light because he approved these new schedules."³⁵ In another letter, the writer longed for the days of Pereira Passos (who was generally not too friendly to the Light) in the prefecture and suggested that the guilt for the new schedule lay not with the Light but with the members of

the municipal council. He accused the municipal council, paid by the taxes of *cariocas*, of only overseeing "the interests of the Light."³⁶ But the protests from the opposition papers were not enough to force the prefecture to alter the new schedule. *Cariocas* either had to pay 200 réis or wait for long intervals to take crowded second class or sectional cars. In effect, the Light managed to squeeze higher fares from the riding public and maintain a profitable streetcar enterprise.

Streetcar Profits

The principal aim of the Light was to make money for its shareholders. Between 1907 and 1911, the streetcars of the Light generated nearly 60 percent of the company's profits and the net revenues as a percentage of gross revenues grew steadily from 35 to 54 percent.³⁷ The return per car mile, the measure of efficiency for streetcar companies, was regularly 15 percent higher in Rio de Janeiro than in William Mackenzie's very profitable Toronto Street Railway Company.³⁸ The concessions to the riding public were relatively minor. The Light fulfilled its objective and made a great deal of money.

The most formidable opponent to the company was the municipal council and prefecture. Mackenzie's remarks to a member of the board two years after the signing of the contract is particularly telling: "You will be aware," he stated, "that a Municipal Government has enough means to prejudice a Company which holds municipal concessions for public services."³⁹ During the contract negotiations, members of the municipal council and prefecture imposed the most costly amendments to the unification scheme—suburban lines and second-class fares. The Light followed the strategy of keeping lines short, fares high and cars infrequent in order to keep profits, or the return per car mile, high. Second-class fares and suburban lines cut into those profits. The most critical limitation to profit making, however, was the inability of the company to raise fares beyond 1907 levels. In the years after the First World War, it was the municipal council and prefecture that refused to allow an increase in fares, not the riding public.⁴⁰ With its capital locked into fixed assets, the Light was unable to walk away from the bargaining table [end p. 54] after the unification contract was signed. Prefects repeatedly turned down petitions from the Light for fare increases, but there was relatively little the company could do. In no uncertain terms, the contract strictly stated that fares could not be increased unless under full agreement with the prefecture. Since Alexander Mackenzie made no provision for inflation, the company's streetcar profits began a steady decline after 1920. By the beginning of the Second World War, it was forced to operate the streetcar service at a loss. For nearly twenty years, the Light had to operate an unprofitable streetcar system. In 1963, the company transferred the property, without compensation and 14 years before the expiration of the franchise, to the city of Rio de Janeiro (McDowall 1988). An increasingly interventionist municipal government rather than the threat of the masses was the real regulator of the Light's streetcar business.

CONCLUSIONS

Popular opposition in Rio de Janeiro to the streetcar services of the Light won minor concessions to the riding public. But before 1920, the Light managed to maintain a very profitable transit enterprise. The real opponent to the company was not the riding public but the municipal government. Although the municipal government claimed it operated with the interests of the working class in mind, it had its own objectives for transportation. Those objectives, tied into grand urban reforms of Rio de Janeiro, included the displacement of the working class and poor population from their downtown tenements to isolated residences in the northern suburbs. Those that were willing to sacrifice their lives and security in protests for improved transportation lost the competition for control of Rio de Janeiro's streetcar services.

NOTES

1. I tackle the question of dependency with a case study of the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company in a forthcoming article.

2. *First Annual Report of the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company, Ltd.*, April 1907. The company added "Tramway" to its name in 1905 after purchasing shares in three of the private streetcar companies in the city. William Mackenzie (1849-1923) is best known for building the Canadian Northern Railway and his directorship of street railway companies in Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg and Birmingham, England (Fleming 1991). In Toronto, William Mackenzie belonged to a tight circle of businessmen-the Toronto 'plutocrats'-who exerted considerable control over corporate business. Members of the group sat on the boards of several corporations involved in the development of utilities, railways, streetcar systems, mining and real estate in Canada and abroad (Gad and Holdsworth, 1990).
3. *First Annual Report of the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company, Ltd.*, April, 1907.
4. For a detailed business history of the Light, see McDowall (1988). For a description of the Light in the context of Canadian investment in Latin America, see Armstrong and Nelles (1988).
5. *Cariocas* are residents of the city of Rio de Janeiro.
6. A. Mackenzie to Pearson (New York), 2 March 1905, Arquivo da Light S. A., Rio de Janeiro, (ALRJ).
7. The "Passos Reforms" is the subject of a number of scholarly works. See Benchimol (1990), Reis (1977), Needell (1984; 1987), Abreu (1987), and Ferrez (1983).
8. Response to Prefect's dispatch by James Mitchell to Dr. Miranda Ribeiro, 11 August 1905, Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (AGCRJ), 54-4-5; Department of Works and Transport to Rio Light, 25 April, 1906, A GCRJ, 54-4-5.
9. A. Mackenzie to Pearson, 2 August 1905, ALRJ, 3--49.
10. I elaborate on the unification contract negotiations in a forthcoming article in *Journal of Latin American Studies*. Also see Boone, 1994.
11. There were speed limits for electric cars-15 km/h in the center city and 20 km/h outside the center-but the Light often did not abide by these limits. The unification contract of 6 November 1907 included speed limits for most of the built up area and speeds that were "convenient and comfortable for the public" for beyond. The accounts in the newspapers of speeding streetcars suggests that speed limits were not enforced. However, the prefecture did send occasional notices of speeding streetcars to the offices of the Light. Department of Works and Transport to Rio Light, 20 November 1909, Arquivo da Light SA., Rio de Janeiro (ALRJ); 22 October, 1909, ALRJ 1-17; 22 November, 1909, ALRJ 1-17; 27 December, 1909, ALRJ.
12. J. M. Smith to Huntress, 25 October, 1907, National Archives of Canada (NAC), MG 28, III 112,4, A44.
13. Huntress to J. M. Smith, 3 October, 1907, NAC, MG 28, III 112, 4 A44.
14. *Correio da Manhã*, 12 January, 1909.
15. None of the newspapers identify Mr. Estruc as anything other than the organizer of the protest.
16. *Correio da Manhã*, 12 January, 1909. **[end p. 55]**
17. *Jornal do Comércio*, 12 January, 1909. *Correio da Manhã*, 12 January, 1909.

18. *Jornal do Comércio*, 14 January, 1909; 15 January, 1909. *Correio da Manhã*, 14 January, 1909; 15 January, 1909.
19. *Jornal do Comércio*, 15 January, 1909.
20. A. Mackenzie to W. N. Walmsley, 12 January 1909, ALRJ. 21 Jeronymo Coelho (Director of Works and Transport) to Rio Light, 9 January, 1909, ALRJ, 1-17.
22. A. Mackenzie to W. N. Walmsley, 12 January, 1909, ALRJ.
23. Residents of old Rua Hypodromo to Prefect, 13 July, 1915, AGCRJ,56-4-15A.
24. C.A. Sylvester to Prefect Correa, 18 October, 1915, A GCRJ, 57-1-17.
25. Response of Prefect Corrêa to Petition of the Rio Light, 25 October, 1915, AGCRJ, 57-1-17.
26. Prefecture to São Cristóvão Company, 27 October, 1915, A GCRJ, 57-1-17.
27. Huntress to Prefect Corrêa, 29 October, 1915, AGCRJ, 5771-17.
28. Terms of the Arbitration, 17 May 1916, Companhia de Carris, Luz e Força do Rio de Janeiro, Tramways Concessões, p. 485.
29. *Jornal do Comércio* 28 March, 1916.
30. *Jornal do Comércio* 18 March, 1911.
31. *Jornal do Comércio*, 24 March, 1911.
32. *Jornal do Comércio*, 18 March, 1911; 20 March, 1911; 24 March, 1911.
33. *Jornal do Comércio*, 18 March, 1911.
34. *Jornal do Comércio*, II March, 1911; 15 March, 1911; 20 March, 1911. *A Notícia*, 14 March, 1911.
35. *Gazeta de Notícias*, 22 March, 1911.
36. *Gazeta da Notícias*, 22 March, 1911.
37. Various issues of the *Annual Report of the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company, Ltd*
38. Figures for Toronto from Armstrong and Nelles (1986, 206) and for Rio from various issues of the *Annual Report of Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company*.
39. A. Mackenzie to Percival Farquhar, 18 September, 1909, ALRJ.
40. A. Mackenzie (Rio de Janeiro) to Rt. Hon. Edwin S. Montagu (Gloria Hotel, Rio de Janeiro), 10 January, 1924, NAC, MG 28, III 112,309.

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RESUMO

Na primeira década do século, uma companhia Canadense comprou e modernizou a sistema dos bondes na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. objectivo da companhia para desenvolver uma rede do trans porte mais eficiente do que eqíativo incitou a oposição popular, as vezes violenta. Alguns requerimentos e revoltas melhoram o serviço dos bondes para os pobres e o publico, mas nesse artigo demonstro que a oposição popular estava relativamente ineficaz na luta de controlar os serviços do transporte. Até 1920, a companhia dos bondes, e o governo municipal, ganharam a luta para controlar a sistema dos transportes no Rio de Janeiro. **[end p. 57]**