Whilst it has sometimes been the case that the discussion of decentralization has only referred to the local level of governmental structures, it may be noted that decentralization involves two general spatial modes-the local and the regional. In the context of emerging debates in Latin America, and especially in the Andean republics, the regional level has received increasing analytical and political weight. It is sometimes suggested that the surfacing of the regional as a political issue is intimately connected to the development of anti-centralist social struggles and mobilizations---Peru and Bolivia being two clear examples. Although these connections are certainly valid it is important to bear in mind that other factors can come into play, factors which relate more to attempts by particular regimes to rationalize and regulate the territoriality of state power. As I shall indicate, the Chilean experience exemplifies this latter connection, although with the return to democracy the meanings given to the regional become a new terrain of political contestation. Indeed, the overall consideration of democracy has come to possess an important territorial dimension with debates on both the regional and local spheres assuming increased significance.

In selecting the cases of Chile and Bolivia, and concentrating on the recent period, I want to show that although the regional dimension of the democracy/decentralization debate has quite different origins in each country, and although the territorial histories and geo-political forces are also quite divergent, nevertheless in the midst of the contemporary discussions of the regionalization of government, we can discern some interesting and instructive parallels. These correspondences must not be over-emphasized, but their existence, as I shall attempt to show, reflect a number of key dilemmas in the territorialization of democracy. My approach will focus on issues of territorial politics and state power, within which the centralization-decentralization thematic will be given major prominence. Although economic factors will be mentioned, my discussion will not give a high profile to the more spatio-economic features of the debates; these have been dealt with in considerable detail for the Chilean case by, for example, de Mattos (1992) and Daher (1991). My analysis will proceed via a separate examination of the Chilean and Bolivian cases, and then in the final section I shall return to the question of the possible comparative lessons to be learnt from these two experiences.[end p. 49]

CHILE: REGIONALIZATION FROM ABOVE
Past Traces of the Regional
Although the idea of administrative decentralization had surfaced before the turn of the century, the overriding orientation of the period since the 1833 Constitution had been the unification of the nation and the creation of an effective central State.¹ However, by the early part of the twentieth century there was a greater sense of the need for some control over centralism, and in 1920 Alessandri, the candidate of the Liberal-Alliance (left-wing Liberals, Radicals and Democrats) argued for the necessity of introducing, along with other reforms (Nunn, 1967), an administrative decentralization to tackle the problems of economic backwardness in the provinces. With this objective in mind the Constitution of 1925 stipulated the establishment of provincial assemblies with representatives designated by the municipalities (Villalobos, 1988, 125).² However, as Bulnes de Granier (1988, 5-8) shows, from an examination of the debates of the time, although there was an awareness of the problems of centralism, there was also a reluctance to legislate for the creation of genuinely independent provincial or local entities. In general, there was a fear of enacting any legislation that might debilitate the political cohesion of the unitary state. Hence, although the 1925 Constitution placed the issue of provincial assemblies on to the political agenda, the legislation that would have been required to bring such entities into life was never introduced.³ Moreover, the powerful position of the Intendant, originally established by the 1833 Constitution, was reproduced within the Constitution of 1925. According to the latter Constitution, the Intendant was regarded as the "natural and immediate agent" of the President of the Republic^.4

During the following thirty to forty years, with the accelerated development of urbanization and industrialization, there was an expansion of the state's role in the economy. Furthermore, the negotiations and political accommodations that took place were mediated through the activities of the major parties. As Dfaz (1989,196) suggests, the compromises that were reached related to national politics and not to rivalries between regional blocs. The social conflicts that emerged had no strong regional grounding; rather, all the political forces of the society concentrated their attention on Parliament and the executive power of the state. In addition, although during a period of around forty years there was a clear process of democratization that began to incorporate greater numbers of the society into political life, this process was not accompanied by any move towards decentralization or the growth of provincial or municipal power.⁵ The territorial centrality of the state was consolidated and no social force emerged to challenge the conditions responsible for the reproduction of central state power.⁶

The Military and Territorial Strategy
A geographical configuration characterized by a unique combination of longitude and unremitting narrowness has been a continuing source of military concern. Potential threats to territorial integrity either through a possible break in the North-South line of the country or by way of an occupation of the more distant regions of the nation state have been a recurrent theme of military strategy in Chile. From the time of the War of the Pacific, and in the context of the degree to which relations with Argentina have been the subject of border tensions, strong garrisons have been maintained in Tarapaca, Antofagasta and Magallanes.

Also, in the wake of the War of the Pacific, a German military mission led by General Korner began the modernization of what became in the words of one commentator, "the most professional army in Latin America" (Nunn,1967,1). However, it was not only a question of modernization, but also of a process of training and discursive framing that went together with a certain "Prussianization" of the Chilean military. This meant, as Arriagada (1986) has indicated, that in the period from 1885 until the First World War the Chilean military came under the influence of a specific political-military orientation. For example, in contrast to the earlier ideas of Clausewitz, which stressed the importance of subordinating military power to political power, and trying to create a greater sense of solidarity between the state and the people, in this later period the Prussian army, under the reign of Emperor Willem II, came to see itself as being increasingly separated from civil society and the state. Such a separation was rooted in the idea that the army was the ultimate guardian of the nation. ⁷ [end p. 50]

Along a related pathway, the Chilean army came under the influence of a geopolitical doctrine that defined the state as a living organism. The organicist perspective on the state, with its roots in social Darwinism, came to form a key component of military thinking on geopolitics in Chile, especially in the period after the Second World War. By 1968 Colonel Augusto Pinochet had published his work on geopolitics, within which the influence of the German school was clearly visible. Whilst it is well-known that the concept of "national security" has a crucial meaning in military discourses on the state and politics in the Southern Cone countries, it also needs to be remembered that there is a closely related concept of "integral security." Hence, whereas national security refers to the protection of the state from any danger or threat, external or internal, to its territorial integrity, authority and institutions, integral security covers wider terrain. Here there is a need to foresee any phenomenon that might signify a present or future threat for the state; at the same time it is necessary to oversee the maximum utilization of the citizens in the fulfillment of national objectives, and to control their moral, intellectual and physical virtues so as to prevent any risk of the decadence of the state and its institutions. As Arriagada (1986,138) observes adherence to this nostrum reflects a vision in which the guardians of geopolitics regard themselves as "doctors of the nation state," caring and developing the political body in accordance with the teachings of "state biology."

Equally, in the geopolitical thinking of the Chilean military, there has been an intimate link between space, the "human mass" and national power. As Pinochet expressed it, national power is a social factor capable of influencing the feelings, thought and will of the human mass; it consists in the "organization of the population in order to exercize dominion over space and over the human mass located within the limits of the state ... " (Pinochet 1974, 153). The population is here a mere instrument or resource at the service of the national power, and the ideal form of political organization is that which permits the direction and guidance of the "human mass."⁸ It is in this kind of context that we can better comprehend the introduction of a series of organizational and administrative innovations in the regulation and control ofterritory and population, after the military coup d'etat of 1973.

In December 1973, the military created the National Commission for Administrative Reform (CONARA). In the first article of the Legal Decree that established the National Commission, it was stated that a suitable administrative regionalization of the country was required. Following on from this pronouncement, in July 1974 two further Legal Decrees were enacted, one of which established the regionalization of the country through the formation of twelve regions plus the Metropolitan Region of Santiago. In replacing the previously existing 25 provinces, the military government created 13 regions, 51 provinces and 318 communes (that were increased subsequently to 343). The region emerged as a new level, whilst the department and sub-delegation disappeared. The province was defined as a micro-region with a geographical ambit, and with a predominant productive activity; the communes were classified as being urban, rural or urban-rural. From 1975 onwards a hierarchical line of command was established, descending down from the President to the regional Intendant and then on to the provincial Governor and the Mayor of the commune. In each territorial domain a structure of power was installed wherein the dominant role was assigned to the "maximum authority" of each respective jurisdiction.

In 1974, the President of the Republic confirmed that although the Chilean state is unitary, the modernization of the state, because of its peculiar geographical conditions, requires a system that permits a development that is administratively and regionally decentralized; in this way, it will be possible to bring about the "coordination and participation of the regions as a function of integration, security, socioeconomic development and national administration" (quoted in Bulnes de Granier, 1988, 12).

Overall, the official legitimization of the new process of regionaiization rested on four interconnected objectives: 1) national integration with reference to both the territorial and the social so that there would be a greater equilibrium in the utilization of resources and population; 2) national security and corresponding geopolitical considerations, including the struggle for internal cohesion and the effective occupation of the territory;⁹ 3) socioeconomic development in terms of an enhanced utilization of the territory, and 4) the [end p. 51] administration of the nation that would be made more efficient through an appropriate decentralization and deconcentration. The instruments or mechanisms set up to realize these objectives can be divided in to four types: a) the hierarchical, as reflected in the territorial organization of government and administration, already mentioned; ¹⁰ b) the technical in the form of regional and provincial secretaries of Planning and Coordination, responsible to the regional Intendant and the provincial Governor respectively; ¹¹ c) the functional in terms of regional Ministerial secretaries and their provincial and communal counterparts, and d) the participatory in the form of the Regional Development Councils (COREDES) and the Communal Development Councils (CODECOs).¹²

Although it is quite evident that geopolitical thought prioritizes the interrelations between space and power, the connections between a policy of regionalization and the influence of a geopolitical perspective might be usefully clarified for the Chilean case.¹³

First, the thematic of territory and its utilization was interpreted in the context of security and development. Thus the strong preoccupation with the non-utilization of resources, or their inappropriate allocation, together with sharp breaks in the occupation of territory reflected a geopolitical articulation of resource development to issues of integral security. Second, the clear anxiety concerning what was regarded as an excessive degree of socio-economic concentration in the metropolitan region of Santiago was linked to the notion that resulting disequilibria and social disparities could help to undermine the internal cohesion of the territorial state, through generating internal struggles and ruptures in national unity.¹⁴ Moreover, in relation to the frontier regions of the country, both North and South,¹⁵ budgetary allocations for infrastructure in general and for the FNDR (National Fund for Regional Development) in particular, revealed that, in the mid-1970s, on a per capita basis the extreme regions of the country received markedly higher allocations (Chateau, 1978,197-200).¹⁶

Finally, in accordance with the imperative of central control and authority, clearly written into the military texts of geopolitical rationale, the process of regionalization, and/or posited decentralization and deconcentration, tended only to reinforce and rationalize central state power. As Chateau (1978, 203) succinctly expresses it, "all the authorities of the government of the interior are nominated by the Executive(from the Regional Intendant to the local Mayor) and as a consequence there is only one line of vertical command, mediated by the intermediate echelons of Intendant and Governor.¹⁷

However, as intimated above, the military junta did emphasize the importance of participation in its plans for regionalization, and for this purpose the COREDES were established. The first point to remember here is that although participation was placed on to the regional agenda by the military, it was only in the 1980 Constitution that any effective institutionalization of participation was envisaged. According to Articles 101 and 102, each region would have a Council of Development, presided over by the Intendant and composed of the provincial Governors, a representative for each one of the institutions of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros and members designated by the principal public and private organs that carried on activities in the region, with the private sector being guaranteed the major representation.

According to Article 102 of the 1980 Constitution, the Regional Council would have the role of assessor to the Intendant, and would be responsible for rendering effective the "participation of the community in the economic, social and cultural progress of the region."¹⁸ Furthermore, however, as far as the approval of plans for regional development and the regional budget itself were concerned, the Intendant would need the agreement of the Council.

These initial Constitutional provisions were subsequently codified and enlarged in a Legal Decree that was promulgated in 1987. With respect to the Regional Development Councils, that were created in 1987, their composition followed the Constitutional guidelines. Thus, apart from the Intendant, the Provincial Governors, representatives from the Armed Forces and the Carabineros, ¹⁹ there were to be five representatives from the principal social, economic and cultural organizations of the state administration, or of enterprises where the state owned at least 50 percent of the property,²⁰ and representatives from the private sector, whose number must equal 60 percent of the total number of representatives in the Council.²¹ This latter section would be formed from the following groups: [end p. 52] business (20 percent), labor (20 percent), professional (7 percent), cultural (7 percent) and organizations promoting social and economic development in the region (6 percent).²² The task of designating the public and private organizations that would have the right to participate in the Councils would be determined by a Commission, consisting ofthree members: the Intendant who would preside, a Minister from the Court of Appeal, with a base in the regional capital, and the Regional Controllor.²³ This Commission would determine the principal public organs that could be considered for eventual representation in the Councils, and all persons and organizations with an interest in participation had to notify the Regional Electoral Tribunales, whose legal function was established by the 1980 Constitution, under article 85.²⁴ A register of organizations would then be drawn up, keeping in mind the various criteria for qualification-for example, inter alia, to be domiciled in the region, to have a recognized federational, union, cultural or educational character or to be a foundation or corporation that promote~ regional development (POlO, 1988,35).

With respect to the various attributes of the Regional Councils, POlO (1988, 43-45) identifies four types: those of a deciding, opinionative, recommending or informing nature. Of those relating to matters of decision-making the allocation of monies from the Regional Development Fund was one of the more salient, together with the approval of relevant development projects, and the regional budget. However, POlO (1988, 46-47), in contrast to Ernizuriz's (1988) more uncritical approach, shows that there was considerable ambiguity in the question of the relations between the Regional Council and the Intendant, so that, for instance, in the event of a conflict between the two parties over the approval of regional projects the final power to decide had not been unequivocally stipulated.²⁵

In the above outline, which has been unavoidably brief, I have described some of the key features of the institutionalization of a new regional domain of governmental power, within which a certain corporatist conception of participation was clearly inscribed.²⁶ As part of the military's project of creating a "purified democracy" based on "real" as opposed to "political" participation, a serious attempt was made to bring into being new organs of governability that would be carefully circumscribed within the orbit of centralist power. Nonetheless, it IS also the case, as both Godoy (1988) and Diaz (1989) have remarked, as well as several other observers,²⁷ that the Chilean military reasserted the role of the regional in a way that generated subsequent political debate on the potential connections between the return to democracy and regional(as well as local) government.

The Difference that Democracy Makes
Whereas, in Europe and North America, the process of transition to democracy, and the Chilean elections of 1989, have been analysed and discussed in considerable detail (Angell and Pollack, 1990, and Rabkin, 1992/93), the issues of regionalization and decentralization have received less attention. This must be partly associated with the fact that during the election campaign the regional question did not receive any notable significance. On one or two occasions the President-to-be Aylwin referred to the importance of regional development, but in the wake of the elections the initial governmental program did not make any reference to the regional level, although the importance of local reforms was mentioned. In fact, as Boisier (1991, 7) reminds us, in the Presidential Message to Congress in May 1990, the regional question did not appear to be seen as an important governmental matter. However, eight months later, at the beginning of 1991, the Government was obliged to publically announce the submission to Parliament of a draft Law which would include a whole series of modifications relevant to the territorial dimensions of government.²⁸ As noted above, the military initiation of a new approach to the importance of regional affairs resuscitated and in a sense re-invented a wider concern with issues of regionalization, both within the parties of the Right, Renovaci6n Nacional (RN), and Uni6n Democrdtica lndependiente (UDI), which had strong regional bases, and also within an emerging sector of intellectuals and professionals who were increasingly concerned by the detrimental effects of centralist state power. The emerging public debate on the regional and local levels of government and democracy thus helped to stimulate a greater awareness in governmental circles of the need to proceed with both regional and local reforms.

The public debate on decentralization and democracy was characterized, as would be expected, [end p. 53] by a variety of interpretations of the meaning, usefulness, importance and objectives of territorializing democratic government. The major political parties gave contrasting significance to questions of regionaiization, as reflected in a series of articles published at the end of the 1980s (ILPES,1989).

The Christian Democrats tended to situate discussions of decentralization and regionalization in the wider "frame of reference" that they gave to all their policies; here questions of "macro-economic equilibrium," gradual and selective introduction of decentralization and the application of principles of justice and regional solidarity loomed large (Boisier, 1989). For the PPD (Partido por La Democracia), their proposals centred on the need to democratize the state apparatus, after such a long period of military dictatorship, and to decentralize and modernize the administration of the state (Abalos and Silva, 1989). Connections have also been made with the need to stimulate regional cultural identity and improve spatial policies on the environment. In comparison, the PAIS (Partido AmpLio de Izquierda SociaLista), although giving some reference to the local and regional in terms of greater popular participation, still remained within rather traditional socialist views on the centrality of political economy and national economic development.²⁹ Absent from party proposals were concrete suggestions for new forms of regional decentralization, and as Cavada (1989, 65) observed, no relation was established between social problems, for example, the struggle against inequality and poverty, and regionality.

On the right of the political spectrum, Renovación NacionaL has given recurrent importance to regional issues in its overall discourse. In this connection, there have been a number of interrelated positions: to diminish the power of the central state; to find ways of giving more power to social and economic organizations, especially within the private sector; to center development on the individual; ³⁰ and to foster new forms of social participation that move away from "overly-politicized" notions of democracy.³¹ In this context, regional and municipal reform were seen as crucial vehicles for a more harmonious pattern of territorial development (Meneses, 1989). Finally, the UDI party, whose cadres were closely associated with the Pinochet regime, has closely followed the military's approach to regionalization, giving particular importance to a free market for the effective regional development of Chile's resources, the privatization of state enterprises and, as with the RN party, a somewhat corporatist interpretation of regional and local participation.³²

It might be usefully noted that there were important debates within these major pol itical groupings. And, in particular, within the emerging perspective of the Concertaci6n in the early part of the 1990s differences of emphasis and priority were certainly a feature of the debates on regionalization and its place in the newly developing Chilean polity.³³ The problems involved in reaching a viable consensus on the nature of regional reform were reflected in the various documents to be produced by the Ministries most responsible for regionalization (Planning and Cooperation and the Interior), as well as in Parliamentary debates and political speeches and documents. One of the most difficult areas concerned the role to be given the Regional Intendant, and the question of the actual composition of Regional Governments; were there to be direct elections or procedures for participation and delegation, or a combination of both as transpired in the Peruvian case at the end of the 1980s? Also, for example, the legal status of the Intendant was discussed in terms of whether the holder of this function should be a Presidential nominee, or subject to direct election? ³⁴ There were also issues concerning the combination of procedures for municipal and regional reform, as well as the speed with which these reforms should be introduced, both topics being firmly placed on the agenda by the RN and UDI parties.

By the middle of 1991, the outlines of a draft Law for Regional Government had been put into place by the Administrative and Regional Development Division of the Ministry of the Interior.³⁵ It was here envisaged that Regional Governments would be constituted by three organs: the Intendant, a Regional Council and a Social and Economic Council for the Region. As an entity of public law, and invested with administrative, governmental and financial attributes, the objective of Regional Governments would be to promote the economic, social and cultural development of their respective areas. The Intendant of the Region would remain appointed by the President of the Republic, [end p. 54] acting as the President's "natural and immediate agent in the region." One of the Intendant's key duties would be to direct the tasks of government at the regional level, and in conformity with the orientations and instructions imparted by the President.

As far as the Regional Council was concerned, it was suggested that fifteen members would be directly elected for a period of four years, and by means of the system of proportional representation. The Social and Economic Council would be composed of members elected from the municipalities of the region, plus members from the social organizations of the region; there would be 36 in all, 18 from the municipalities, 6 from communal organizations, 6 from business organizations, and 6 from labour organizations, all legally constituted in the region.³⁶ Finally, with respect to the financiaUbudgetary aspects of regional government, provision was made for central government transfers, allocations via the National Fund for Regional Development and income via a variety of other miscellaneous categories (regional services, donations and levies etc.). No hard figures were given in this particular document, but by the end ofthe following year, we can see that three main sources were given for the financing of regional governments. They were: i) the National Fund for Regional Development, whose funds were to be increased by 23.6 percent in 1993, rising to 53 thousand million pesos, although still under 5 percent of the national budget; ii) taxation from mineral patents, (which had previously gone directly to the central government), now 70 percent for the regions and 30 percent for the municipalities, and iii) sectoral investments of a regional allocation amounting to an estimated 46 thousand million pesos.³⁷

The draft document for a Law on Regional Government, first produced in 1991, became effective in September 1992. As has been noted, for the first time in the institutional history of Chile regional governments came into legal being. Entities endowed with the ostensibly autonomous administration of economic, social and cultural development for their respective regions, these governments were to be allocated their own budgets and patrimonies. In terms of overall investment, it was officially reported that the central government would earmark aooroximatelv US $220 million. a sum equivalent to around 20 percent of national investment, ³⁸ for the operation of the new regional entities.

As regards the electoral procedures, the Regional Councils would be composed of two members from each one of the provinces that form part of the region,³⁹ this being a change from the preliminary draft law, mentioned above. In the event that the region had less than one million inhabitants, ten more members could be elected, and in the case of a region having more than one million inhabitants, a further 14 members could be elected. There would be 244 regional councillors for the whole country.

Furthermore, each regional government would have a double component: a Regional Executive, including the Intendant and the Regional Ministerial Secretaries, and the Regional Council, that was defined as the representative organ of the regional community. The Intendant would have the double responsibility of representing the President and the regional government. The regional governments would have three major attributes: i) the territorial ordering of investments; ii) the coordination of social policies, and iii) the promotion of production.

In 1993, on the eve of elections for the Regional Councils, the Head of the Regional Planning Di vision of the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, commented that "This was the greatest institutional transformation of the century, not for what it is today, but for the effect it is going to produce." ⁴⁰ However, the elections themselves did not seem to create an enormous amount of interest, as compared with the 1989 elections for the COREDES, and for the 244 councillor positions there were only 330 candidates; the Concertaci6n gained 153 places and the Opposition 86.⁴¹ El Mercurio commented that since any member of a region who wanted to participate in the elections had to go via the established party structures and hierarchies, there was not a great deal of response from the population as a whole. But, as the article rightly continues, if these new organs of government remain open to authentic regional initiatives and drive, they may come to fulfill real regional needs in the future^.42

Certainly it is the case that the regionalization process has its own dynamic, and during 1993 there have been a number of anti-centralist protests in Arica and Antofagasta, with strikes and [end p. 55] demonstrations.⁴³ Moreover, from other parts of the country expressions of regionalist discontent are surfacing; demands for the elections of Intendants and Governors; claims for a substantial increase in the size of the National Fund for Regional Development; calls for a genuine decentralization of ministerial control from Santiago, and in general a greater degree of power to make decisions on public works and large-scale economic projects.⁴⁴

It has always been noted that Chile, in comparison with other Latin American nations, has been a country with a less sharply-formed regional consciousness. One of the questions posed by regional specialists in Chile has been how can strong and forward-looking regional identities be nurtured in a country without strong histories of regional protest and struggle? Decentralization at the regional level will not be effective if there is no commitment on the part of the regions themselves to make it work. And, with a process of regionalization that has been quintessentially characterized by a top-down, dirigiste orientation, it will not be easy to turn that process into a more enabling experiment. On the other hand, in a certain dialectical fashion, regionalization from above may well provoke a new wave of regional identifications and mobilizations to match in novelty the institutionalization process itself.

BOLIVIA: THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO REGIONALIZATION

Antecedents of Centralism
According to the Constitution of 1826, and in keeping with many other Latin American countries, the political-administrative division of Boli via, in Napoleonic mode, would be organized into departments, provinces and cantons.⁴⁵ In the 1830s legislative and judicial bodies were established which included provincial and departmental councils. However by the end of the century, new legislation had omitted a role for these councils and the 1888 Law on Political and Administrative Organization, plus the Regulatory Code of 1903, consolidated the verticality of bureaucratic power through establishing a chain of command from the President of the Republic, through the prefects, subprefects and finally down to local magistrates (corregidores). The central state divested itself of the departmental and provincial councils and from this time onwards the Bolivian state came to be characterized by a marked territorial centrality of power (Sandoval 1991,207-211).

This centrality of bureaucratic power was associated with the dominant post-Independence groups based in and around POtOSI, Oruro, Sucre and La Paz, in which a combination of silver-mining interests, the military, Church hierarchy, rural landowners and the Conservative Party formed an initial regionalized oligarchic power bloc. By the end of the century, as tin mining developed, and as La Paz grew rapidly in its function of servicing the new extractive activity, the Liberal Party, with support from the expanding urban sectors of La Paz, as well as the tin-mining industry, rose up against the Conservative-led oligarchy. The 1899 Revolt ushered in a new regime, but as Klein (1992, 164) argues, the old Conservative and new Liberal regimes shared a number of common positions; they were both committed to the government subsidization of transport, heavy support for the mining sector in general, the development and modernization of urban centres, and expansion of the hacienda system, at the expense of Indian communities. Furthermore, there was a continuation of centralist state power.

Decentralization and the Fear of Disintegration
Unlike the Chilean experience, in the case of Bolivia, the development of state centralism must be seen together with an important federalist/regionalist current that originated in the last century and still tends to permeate much of the contemporary discussion of decentralization and regionalization. Already in the 1870s, leading groups in Santa Cruz had established the Junta Superior del Estado Federativo Oriental, which called for a concerted challenge to the unitary and centralist nature of the Bolivian state (Sandoval, 1991,220). Subsequently, the federalist current continued to press its case in Congress, but was never able to mount a sufficiently strong military opposition to the central state. Nevertheless, the sense of being subject to centralist oppression persisted in Santa Cruz through to the twentieth century,⁴⁶ and in the documents of the Comite Cívico de Santa Cruz one can still locate expressions of this original regionalist, if not federalist, position. In current debates on the desirability of regional or departmental [end p. 56] decentralization, the specter of federalism tends to haunt some of the exchanges between La Paz-based and Santa Cruz-based politicians. But in addition to the presence of an older federalist current, first expressed in the case of the Santa Cruz region, but now tending to surface in some of the positions taken up by groups in Tarija and Chuquisaca, we have a second geopolitical reality which continues to affect contemporary views on decentralization, especially within the military. I am referring here to the question of the territorial integrity of the nation state. In the Bolivian case, in stark contrast to the Chilean experience, there has been an important history of territorial loss.

Apart from the original establishment of the Confederación Peru-Boliviano in 1836, which was effectively terminated by Chilean military intervention three years later, the geopolitical history of Bolivia has been characterized by a series of forced contractions and retreats, which have undoubtedly had a profound effect on what I shall refer to as the nation's, and more particularly, the military's geopolitical unconscious. In the period from the 1860s to the 1930s, Bolivia lost a total of 1,292,546 square kilometers of territory, more than its present size of 1,098,581 square kilometers. In wars with Brazil (1867), in the Amazonian region, with Chile (1879), along the Pacific coast, and with Paraguay (1932-35), in the Chaco War, Bolivia lost over half a million square kilometers of territory (Sandoval, 1991, 254). In other instances of border disputes with Peru, Argentina and Brazil, Bolivia ceded over a further three-quarters of a million square kilometers.

In our consideration of the Chilean military's conception of territory and power, reference was made to the geopolitical sensitivity of border zones. The need for spatial surveillance was coupled with an evolving historical sense of effectiveness and success. In the Bolivian case, however, where protecting the territorial integrity of the nation state involves guarding frontiers with five other Latin American states, frontiers which are a reflection of past defeats, geopolitical sensitivity can only be intensified. In this context, the idea of devolving or decentralizing power from the center to the regions, to zones closer to those other contiguous nation states, carries with it a sense of danger, a rooted sentiment of vulnerability. In addition, there has also been an historical association between external wars and loss of territory, as occurred after the Chaco War of the early 1930s, and very severe internal conflicts and political turbulence, including projects for administrative decentralization, as in 1931, (Romero, 1989, 69) or, as in the 1899 Revolt, an association between regional conflicts and acute national crisis.⁴⁷ It is from these elements of the geopolitical unconscious that we can make a link with the way in which some thinking on decentralization is associated with a fear of disintegration.

At the beginning of the 1990s, when public debate surrounding the preparation of a Law for Departmental Governments was in full swing, a leading representative of the ADN (Acción Democrática Nacionalista) party of the Right (Banzer being its leader), and deputy for Cochabamba, asserted that such a Law for new regional governments could be tantamount to a "tool for the destruction of the Bolivian state."⁴⁸ In a somewhat more restrained tone, the Secretary General of the Unión Cívica Solidaridad party in Santa Cruz stressed the need to do everything possible to maintain the unity of the country, and that, in contrast, the creation of autonomous departmental governments could signify a weakening of the state as a whole.⁴⁹ Similarly, Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada of the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria) party, the new President in 1993, indicated that he was not in favor of political decentralization, posing the rhetorical question-"Why do we want nine bad departmental governments when we already have one in La Paz?⁵⁰ Connected to these expressions of opposition to decentralization, we can also find statements which carry a good deal of reticence and skepticism about the urgency or desirability of decentralization. The President of the Chamber of Deputies announced in the middle of 1991 that the process of political and administrative decentralization would take at least two decades to be executed in its entirety; the process would be "gradual and complex."⁵¹ Correspondingly, an MNR deputy, taking part in a debate on decentralization, emphasized the importance of gradual change, ⁵² and overall, even in circles that strongly support decentralization, one continues to find an expressed need for caution, and for responsibility.⁵³ [end p. 57]

Opposition and reluctance towards decentralization must not be interpreted solely in terms of the fear of weakening the state or disintegrating the nation; other factors such as regional rivalry, especially as between La Paz and Santa Cruz, and genuine concern at the possibility of creating regionalized bureaucracies have also had an important restraining influence. But, in contrast to Chile, the Bolivian discussion of decentralization and democracy has emerged in a context of strong regional identities, of regional social movements and organizations such as the Civic Committees (Comités Cívicos). How have these organizations influenced the difficult transition to regionalization in Bolivia?

The Challenge to Centralism
In the long period from the 1899 Revolt until the end of the 1940s, the territorial centrality of the state, coupled as it was to the dominant groups in the tin mining and landowning sectors, remained intact although not unchallenged. During this extended period the mining zones and the cities of La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro were the most important recipients of state investment. In response to the continuation of this spatio-economic bias, a number of protests were launched by the leading groups of the Santa Cruz region, in which the central government was called upon to give more priority to development and communications for this eastern region. For example, in 1905 the Historical and Geographical Society of Santa Cruz demanded that the government construct a railway link to Santa Cruz and on into the Amazon region; also, in a well-known memorandum, the Society demanded a new government policy of protection for the production and commercialization of commodities from the Santa Cruz region. By 1921, similar demands had erupted into a revolt when faced with continual central government refusal to invest in railway construction, and in 1924 a Revolutionary Junta formed by militants from diverse political groupings took over the city, accusing the government of corruption, and ineptitude, whilst, at the same time, expressing regionalist sentiments (Flores and Laserna 1985, 62). Just over 25 years later in 1951 the Comité pro-Santa Cruz was established, and this became the forerunner for the later development of civic committees in other regions of the country. Thus before the National Revolution of 1952, there were already in place, as in the case of Santa Cruz, the roots of subsequent regional mobilizations.

The 1952 Revolution which brought fundamental changes to the organization of the mining and agricultural sectors, ushering in a period of radical reform and nationalization, also brought in its wake important regional changes. In particular, the Santa Cruz region came to be connected by road to Cochabamba and from the 1950s onward it witnessed a new wave of economic development. With the opening up of its agricultural frontier and the stimulation of agro-industrial production, combined with increased state and private investments in the region, as well as the revenue that accrued to it from its petroleum resources, Santa Cruz became an increasingly crucial region in the territorial integration of the country. This process of change was also accompanied by anti-centralist agitation, as occurred in the case of the conflict over what percentage of the total value of petroleum production could remain within the department of Santa Cruz,⁵⁴ as with the later conflict over the political direction of the central government. This latter dispute led into the period of military dictatorship of the 1970s, when Banzer's ascent to power had been supported by dominant groups in Santa Cruz who were opposed to the radical nationalist policies of the previous government (Laserna 1986, 89).

In the 1970s, other regional protests and mobilizations developed, for example in the South, where from 1977 the three departments of Chuquisaca, Tarija and Potosí formed the Bloque Cívico del Sur. Their major objective was to press for the initiation of public works projects (road connections, infrastructure, communications and essential services), which reflected the relative isolation and undeveloped nature of these areas. The regional bloc, however, was largely dominated by an aggregation of urban elites and local notables, and the peasantry had no effective participation (Gantier,1983).

In the case of Cochabamba, in 1972 the JUNCO (Junta de Comunidad) was established which subsequently came to be fused with the Comite pro Cochabamba (which was concerned with departmental issues as well as the problems of the city of Cochabamba). In 1976, JUNCO led a local protest against the absence of projects, specifically [end p. 58] designed for Cochabamba, in the five-year plan approved by the Banzer government. In 1978, there was a local stoppage when workers, teachers and administrators of the University were able to obtain regional backing for their wages dispute with the central government. Lastly, before its fusion into the broader, departmental Comité Cívico de Cochabamba, the JUNCO convened a new strike against the military junta in 1982, calling for a return to constitutional rule. In contrast to the regional political structure in Santa Cruz, in Cochabamba protests were more designed to win concessions from the central state in matters of specific local grievances and there was no regionalist organization with the desire to interpellate a wide range of social subjects into a broad anti-centralist project (Laserna,1983).

In the early part of the 1980s, whilst García Meza was still in power there was an attempt made by the military junta to bring all the Comité Cívicos Departmentales together into a corporatist Comité Cívico Nacional. This project of incorporation was rejected by the departmental committees and their persistent call for a return to democracy was an important factor in the success of the oppositional movement as a whole.⁵⁵ The return to constitutional rule in 1982 was then accompanied by a growing clamor for decentralization.

By 1984, a decentralization bill had been drafted by a government commission, and a special session of Congress, the first in 50 years, was convened to study the bill. Already by this time the civic movements from all the departments were threatening to paralyse the country in support of their demand for increased political and administrative autonomy. However, centralist elements in the Congress had managed to retain the existing administrative structure whereby the governing authority at the departmental level would continue to be a presidentially-appointed prefect.⁵⁶ In turn the prefect would appoint sub-prefects(the top provincial authorities) who would name district corregidores. Departmental government would be complemented with administrative secretariats reporting to central government ministries. A directly-elected council in every province and departmental capital would be set up to assist and control the local government. Although they would not have legislative powers, these councils would promote grass-roots participation.

The government then submitted these proposals to Congress for debate, and that very process of debate and discusssion has proceeded through the 1980s with a variety of proposals and counter-proposals. Indeed, by 1991, the civic committees had submitted over 20 proposals relating to administrative and political decentralization (Urenda 1992,91), but still no effective consensus had emerged in the Congress. In 1992, a new draft Law on Decentralization was published and this represented the work of a widely-based National Commission for Regional Development, established by the Senate. Again, several of the key points at issue were characterized by a number of different proposals; for example, on the election of the Prefect, there were four proposals ranging from designation by the President to direct popular elections.⁵⁷ The continuing lack of consensus, and the difficult transition to the regionalization of democracy were also reflected in differences among, and sometimes within, the Comites Cívicos

During the early part of 1992, for instance, the Comité Cívico de La Paz which is an agglomeration of cultural associations, sporting clubs, neighbourhood committees and local branches of trade unions, was demanding a greater share for La Paz in the central government's investment budget. La Paz accounts for about 30 percent of Bolivia's population and generates almost 60 percent of the government's tax revenues. However it receives less than 20 percent of the public investment funds, and according to protesters, who were able to bring the city of La Paz to an almost complete standstill for one day in February 1992, the planned allocation for 1992 gave La Paz US $28 per capita public investment funds, compared with US $99 per capita for Santa Cruz and US $168 for Tarija. The civic committee was thus demanding 25 percent of the national public investment budget and repayment by the national treasury of a debt they calculate at US $40 million. In addition, the committee was demanding autonomy in the management of the investment funds.⁵⁸

Other conflicts between regions are mentioned by Urenda (1987, 114-120), and there are at least three other sources of difference and conflict that can be noted. First, rural-urban differences in relation to the discussion of decentralization and regionalization are crucial. It has been frequently observed that the demands for decentralization eman- [end p. 59] ating from the departments and the civic committees are urban-oriented and do not connect with or include the question of peasant communities and rural development. Oporto (1991, 115), for example, argues that decentralization should be conceived of as a process of deconcentrating power not only from the State to the departments but rather to the provinces. He suggests that the role of the provinces should be re-valorized as a way of ensuring greater participation of the "rural and peasant society" in regional, micro-regional and local development.

Second, it has been observed that some of the civic committees do not reflect any of the issues being developed by indigenous organizations such as the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpaj Katari de Liberación (MRTKL).⁵⁹ The indigenous question is not only fundamental in the debate on local and regional forms of decentralization, but also in the wider treatment of social change in Bolivia (Rivera Cusicanqui 1993). Therefore, the future effectiveness of the civic committees will be inevitably linked to their ability to make connections with the new indigenous movements in Bolivia.

Third, in terms of possible conflicts inside the civic committees, the question of gender continues to remain central. Although within some committees, as in Cochabamba, there is a Comite Cívico Feminino, and although, according to one of this committee's representatives, ⁶⁰ progress in the struggle against machismo has been made, many problems persist, including the making of connections with the federation of peasant women in the rural areas of Cochabamba. The problems involved in connecting women's organizations in the rural and urban zones of a given department seem to be quite widespread, as are the potential conflicts that have emerged between employers and union groups within the same civic committee.⁶¹

CONVERGING ISSUES OF REGIONALIZATION
Despite the fact that Chile and Bolivia represent two very different cases, not only in terms of the discussion of decentralization and democracy, but also in a wider context of state-society relations and modes of historical development, nevertheless it is possible, when we come to look at processes of regionalization, to discern some instructive parallels.

First, in spite of the quite different regional histories of the two countries, the question of the possible connection between a regional level of government and the extension of democratic principles, has become quite prominent in the 1990s. In the Chilean case, this comes in the wake of a long period of military dictatorship, whereas in Bolivia the debate on the difficult transition to regionalization began in the 1980s, and is now in a crucial stage. In the example of Chile the initial impetus came from the Pinochet regime, whereas in the case of Bolivia, the continuing activities of the civic committees, which during the 1980s became important regional social organizations, have been essential in building the momentum for a regionalization of democracy.

Second, the procedures for institutionalizing democracy at the regional level have been characterized in both cases by a new politics of center-region articulation. This is manifested in at least two ways: a) around the role and power of the Intendant or Prefect; and b) in relation to the actual composition of the Regional or Departmental Assemblies. The Intendant or Prefect is in some sense a hinge function; there is a potential duality of loyalty ---to what extent can the Executive Authority control this site of power to maintain influence over the regions? Alternatively, how will the regions be able to acquire sufficient authority to bring this hinge site of power more within their own orbit of jurisdiction? Similarly, with the actual composition of Assemblies at the regional level, both countries have seen important debates on how these new political spaces should be structured; to what extent should their be direct election and to what extent should their be sectoral representation? In both instances the contested meanings of democracy are placed firmly on to the political agenda.

Finally, in both cases, the relations between regions and socio-political identity are vital, although in contrasting ways. In the case of Chile, a country without a vibrant history of regional conflicts and mobilizations, the question of regional identity is now becoming, as a result of changes from above, a key point of debate. New protests and mobilizations are an initial reflection of the trend towards a popular expression of regional identification. In the case of Bolivia, the greater degree of regional heterogeneity and the longer history of regional politics mark out a greater complexity and fluidity. At the same time the issue of the regional content for democratization [end p. 60] opens up a wider debate on the role of the state and the function of political change. It also, as in the Chilean case, highlights the need to think of decentralization more in relation to democracy and its deepening than in relation to the circumscription of privatization.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge financial support received from WOTRO (The Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Research in the Tropics) and CEDLA, University of Amsterdam. This support made it possible to carry out field research in Chile and Bolivia during 1991. Whilst in Chile I benefitted from help and assistance given by Carlos de Mattos of the Instituto de Estudios Urbanos of the Catholic University of Chile, and in Bolivia, I received support from Roberto Lasema of CERES in Cochabamba and from José Blanes of CEBEM in La Paz. The usual disclaimers apply.

NOTES
1. Before 1833 there had been what Godoy (1988, p. 56) refers to as a "fleeting attempt at federalism" during what in Chile is referred to as the "first anarchy" of the period between Independence and the Constitution of the Nation-State (1818-1833). Unlike other Latin American countries the internal bourgeiosie united quite quickly and under the leadership of Portales succeeded in imposing a "conservative-Catholic-authoritarian" regime which laid the bases for a centralist pattern of development (Díaz 1989, 193).

2. Their main objective would be to prepare plans for local development which would have to be submitted to the provincial Intendente for approval. They would have the possibility to pass resolutions, although these could be vetoed by the Intendente unless the assemblies were able to pass a two-thirds majority. Further, they were legally granted the authority to establish specific local contributions, but these provisions were never realized (Villalobos 1989).

3. As far as the political-administrative division of the country was concerned, the 1925 Constitution provided for 25 provinces which were divided in their turn into communes, which were never granted the necessary attributes to make them effective entities of administration, in contrast to the municipalities (Díaz, 1989, 196)

4. One of the key functions of the Intendente was the inspection and monitoring of all public works and services falling within the territory of the province. Under the Intendente, there were Governors who were responsible for the smaller departments. They were nominated by the President, after being proposed by their respective Intendentes. Under the Governors, there were sub-delegates, and under these there were inspectors for the districts. The chain of command was centred at the apex of the system, the President. (See Chile 1991).

5. According to Juan Cavada of the Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación, Salvador Allende already had a plan for establishing regions with their own resources in the late 1940s, but his proposal never received sufficient support. Interview, Santiago, 23 May, 1991.

6. Some would argue that during the period of the Unidad Popular government (1970-73), attempts were made to put the idea of the attainment of a strong regional and provincial development on the agenda, but the record was mixed. In an early document on regional development policy, the major emphasis fell on trying to create a more deconcentrated and regionally integrating pattern of development. Four spatial planning zones were suggested, but although "political and administrative decentralization was conceived as an important instrument of the government's programme," the orientation of planning remained centralized and little was done to re-structure the territorial hierarchy of decision-making (see ODEPLAN, 1971). Also, for a brief discussion, see Bedrack (1990, 229-231), and Cavada (1985,12-13), who refers to discussions within the Allende government to introduce "budgetary regionalization," whereby regional preferences would be taken into account in the formulation of the national budget.

7. According to Arriagada (1986, 79-80), in the period before 1914 the Prussian army came to be increasingly conservative in its orientation, developing a deep disdain towards constitutional order, the Parliament and the worker's movement. In a connected and quite detailed examination, Arriagada describes the corresponding evolution of anti-socialist ideas in the Chilean military during the early part of this century (92-107).

8. For an extended discussion of the geopolitics of the Chilean military, see Arriagada (1986, 127-138, and Chateau (1978).

9. Under this objective it was further noted that "centralism conspires against internal cohesion and an effective occupation of the territory ... since it is through the attraction of the cities that "belts of poverty" are created which are inclined to frustration, lack of adaptation and subversion," Chateau (1978, 183).

10. It may be pointed out here that in contrast to previous periods the government and administration ofthe territory were brought together in a more centralized structure, and also in comparison with the 1965-1973 period regionalization became far more than regional planning.

11. According to the 1974 Legal Decree, no. 573, the regional Intendente would, inter alia, be responsible for the formulation and realization of the policies and plans of regional development of the organs of the State, as well as for the supervision and implementation of public services of the State that come under regional jurisdiction.

12. It can be further added that last but not least the regionalization of the institutional apparatuses was linked to the regionalization of the military apparatus, reinforcing the sense of a total territorial reform of the state. (see Díaz [1989, 201]). [end p. 61]

13. The following paragraphs are based on Jorge Chateau's (1978) excellent analysis of geopolitics and regionalization in Chile.

14. As we noted earlier on in the text, the idea of integral security, discussed by Arriagada, very much takes account of all the possible social and economic causes of a potential internal decay of the state.

15. Those "extreme regions" as they were called, were viewed by the military, as one Chilean geographer has usefully observed, in terms of zones of "particular geopolitical sensitivity." See the comments of Sepúlveda González, ex-director of the Department of Geography of the University of Chile, in La Epoca, (Santiago), 20 May 1991,7.

16. The FN.D.R. which was created in 1975 constituted the principal and almost unique instrument of regional economic policy. The official intention was that the FN.D.R. ought to be financed from at least 5 percent of national tax and customs income, but in the 1976-1983 period the Fund never received this kind of financial support, and even in 1980, the most advantageous year, it only received just under 2.5 percent of such income. See Abalos and Lira (1986, 190).

17. Such a system of organized hierarchy can remind us of Mariátegui's old phrase, "centralist decentralization."

18. All the citations mentioned in these passages are taken from the official Constitución Política de La Republica de Chile, 1980 (Chile, 1991): 70-71.

19. The 1980 Political Constitution made no connection between regional development and the responsibilities of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros. Such a connection can only be found in the 1974 Law (no. 573), which established that the concept of development "must be incorporated within the Regime of Internal Administration, as a preferential function of the State, and intimately linked to the order and internal security of the country." (Pozo 1988,28).

20. Following Article 2 of the 1987 Law (no. 18605), one of these five representatives would have to be either a Rector of a State University, or of an Institute of Higher Education of the same character, or failing this, the Rector or Director of a public teaching institution (Chile, 1988, 7). The importance given to Higher Education connects to the military regime's policy of "decentralizing" University education away from the capital where much of the opposition to Pinochet's rule had originated, especially so in the early 1 980s.

21. The origins of this stipulation lie in the fact that in 1987 the Constitutional Tribunal declared that all the articles of the COREDES law must have an organic Constitutional rank. Laws of such a desciption carry with them a three-fifths provision for the passing of legislation (Errazuriz (1988, 33-35). The privilege here gi ven to the pri vate sector reflects of course the general neo-liberal orientation of the Pinochet regime.

22. As Pozo (1988, 30) observes, there were a number of problems with the specification of the various layers for the participation of private organizations; in respect of the business layer the citeria privileged the large enterprises over the medium and smaller scale firms; as regards the representation of labour, those workers not belonging to registered sindicatos would be excluded, and with reference to the professional and cultural layers no clear criteria were developed.

23. The ControlIor General for the Republic as a whole had a series of functions and attributes laid down in the 1980 Constitution; they included inter alia control over the legality of the Acts of the Administration and management of the general accountability of the Nation (Chile, 1989, 64). The Regional Controllors were to have comparable functions for the specific territorial jurisdiction of the regions.

24. These Tribunals consisted of a Minister from the Court of Appeal, and two lawyers designated by the Qualification Tribunal for Elections (Pozo, 33).

25. It has to be indicated here that there seems to be a lack of consensus in the treatment of this theme by those writers who have analysed the regionalization process in Chile. On the one hand, Díaz (1989) and Godoy (1988) give a great deal of emphasis to the powers of the Regional Intendente, without discussing the Regional Electoral Tribunals, nor the special Regional Commission, whereas Errazuriz (1988) and Bulnes de Granier (1988) adopt a rather uncritical position in regard of the hierarchical nature of the regional reforms. In comparison, Pozo's (1988) analysis combines a comprehensive and clear account of the somewhat laborious mechanisms for participation with a sharp critical appraisal.

26. One cannot help recalling an excerpt from one of Pinochet's early speeches, in which he averred that," the conscious and responsible participation of the citizenry is appropriate as a key element in a Ii ving and puri fied democracy." ... but this wiII only be fruitful when the "organizations of education and labour have been depoliticized, ... so that they wi II no longer be the instrument of any party or political group, but rather the expression of the real feeling of all those who constitute the group from the lowest level upwards," quoted in Pozo (1988, 17).

27. In interviews conducted with a number of specialists in regional studies, one of the recurrent themes that emerged related to the role of the military in placing on to the political agenda, perhaps for the first time in the history of Chile, the question of the real possibility of future regional governments. For example, Sergio Boisier noted how Pinochet, by stressing the regional/local/territorial, stimulated expectations of change and helped to produce future decentralist aspirations, (Interview, 8 May, 199 I, Santiago).

28. It might be added here that President Aylwin has not been known for his enthusiastic support for regionalization, and is reported to have commented that giving too much emphasis to the regions would be tantamount to "Argentinianizing the country," mentioned in an interview with a government official, May 199 I, Santiago.

29. As Cavada (1989, 48-51) shows in his interesting discussion of the history of socialist thought on regional problems in Chile, the Socialist Party, and Salvador Allende, in particular in the late 1940s, did give importance to tackling the problems of centralism and regional disparities in development, but this never became a "central theme" of party discourse.

30. This view was clearly expressed by Senator Francisco Prat of the RN Party during a round table on Government Reform and Regional Administration, organized by the Centro de Estudios Públicos in Santiago (23 May 199 I). He clearly stated that the purpose of decentralization and regionalization should be the development of the individual.

31. In May 1991, the President of the RN Party, Andrés Allamand stated that the position of his Party on regional and local reform would ensure a "reasonable margin of administrative and [end p. 62] financial autonomy for the regional and municipal governments." Quoted in El Mercurio, (Santiago) 5 May 1991, J3.

32. For a relevant discussion of DOl's approach to regional issues see Sugg (1989).

33. For a discussion of the general formation of the Concertaci6n see Angell and Pollack (1990). Within the different Ministeries, Foxley (Hacienda) was known to be lukewarm in his support for regionalization, whereas Krauss (Interior) was much more positive.

34. It should not be assumed that the Regional Intendentes would necessarily be against a greater degree of democracy at the regional level, or for more influence for the Regional Councils. In an interview with the Regional Intendente for Bío Bío (Region VIII), Adolfo Veloso comments that he would welcome a Regional Council composed of people elected by popular vote. Tiempo Regional, Concepción, no. I, Mayo, 1991, 8.

35. The following passages are taken from Chile, 1992b.

36. The document contained 25 pages of information pertaining to the establishment of Regional Governments and there is no space here to go into all the details.

37. Information given in El Mercurio (Santiago), Edición internacional, 24-30 December, 1992,6.

38. Ibid., 17-23 September 1992.

39. Ibid. Whichever citizen was able to be sponsored by a number not less than 0.5 percent of the citizens inscribed in the electoral register of the respective province could declare themselves a candidate. Otherwise each candidate had to be nominated by at least 2 councillors from their respective province.

40. Fernando Ordónez, quoted in El Mercurio, Edición internacional, 8-14 April 1993, I.

41. Ibid., 3.

42. Ibid.

43. See El Mercurio, Edición internacional, 15-21 April 1993, and El Mercurio, Edición internacional, 1-7 July 1993, I.

44. See El Mercurio, Edición internacional, 26 Aug.-l September 1993, 6. The region discussed in this instance was Region X in the far south of the country.

45. Bolivia began its existence with 5 departments: Chuquisaca, La Paz, Potosi, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, and by the 1840s the departments of Oruro, Tarija, Litoral and Beni had come into existence. In 1938 the department of Pando was created to bring the total number to 10. By the 1950s there were 110 provinces and 1750 cantons (Sandoval 1991, 212-213).

46.. Sandoval (1991, 249-250), for example, gives us the case of the conflict that emerged in the 1950s surrounding the question of petroleum revenue. According to a previous Law from 1938, each department producing petroleum could retain up to 11 percent of the value of their respective production, but the centralist government of Siles Zuazo in the years 1957-1959 passed a Legal Code on Petroleum which returned full financial control over these resources to the national treasury.

47.. This point was emphasized to me in an interview (26 June, 1991) with Dr. Carlos Dabdoub, a Bolivian Deputy, and President of the Commission on Regional Development and Integration. A similar point is made by J. de la Fuente in an article in Opinión, 19 June 1991, Cochabamba.

48. Statement given by Guido Camacho, and quoted in Presencia (La Paz), 11 June 1991, 5.

49.. William Torrico, quoted in El Deber (Santa Cruz), 23 de Junio de 1991, 18.

50. Ibid., 22 June 1991,25.

51. Fernando Kieffer, quoted in Opinión, 16 Junio 1991, 4.

52. Joaquin Monasterio, quoted in El Deber, 21 June 1991, 13.

53. It is interesting to note how the fear of a presupposed disintegration of the nation, consequent upon political decentralization, can provoke a strong rebuttal, as the Departmental Prefect for Cochabamba shows, with his comment that the idea that "decentralization could constitute a factor of national disintegration must be banished." Quoted in La Razón (La Paz), 9 June 1991,3.

54. Flores and Laserna (1985, 63-64), and Sandoval (1983,163-165) have discussed this conflict, showing how Santa Cruz was able to force through its claim to be able to retain 11 percent of the gross value of petroleum production, referred to as the petroleum regalías (perquisites), as originally formulated in a 1938 Law. This regional success was not achieved without official repression and the imprisonment of civic leaders.

55. It is worthwhile indicating here that although the civic committee for Santa Cruz played a supportive role in relation to the military intervention of the early 1970s, in the case of the García Meza dictatorship the Comité Cfvico de Santa Cruz was strongly in support of a return to democracy. In fact, according to its President, Dr. Freddy Terrazas, the ComitéCívico de Santa Cruz was the first civic committee to petition for the return to constitutional rule in 1981, and subsequently it led the call for decentralization, including the direct election of the Prefect, as well as the Departmental Assemblies. (Interview, 24 June 1991, Santa Cruz).

56. This would be in accordance with the Political Constitution of 1967, within which it is stated under Article 109 that the Prefects represent the Executive Authority, having under their office the Subprefects in the provinces and the corregidores in the cantons (Bolivia, 1968,60).

57. The two other possibilities were that a) the Prefect could be appointed by the President from the members of the Departmental Assembly, or b) the Prefect could be appointed by the President from a list of three submitted by the Departmental Assembly (See Comisión 1992, 19-20).

58. For further information see Latin American Weekly Report, 27 February, 1992, WR-92-08. On the history of the protest movement in La Paz, see Blanes (1983).

59. This was strongly emphasized by Edgar Camacho of FLACSO in an interview in La Paz, 27 June 1991.

60. Interview with Sra. Rosa-María Gutíerrez, Secretaría General del Directorio de Comité Cívico Feminino in Cochabamba, 25 June 1991.

61. Mentioned in an interview with Henry Oporto of CIDRE, in Cochabamba, 19 June 1991.

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RESUMEN
Este trabajo presenta a Chile y Bolivia como ejemplos de paises en los cuales ha surgido el debate sobre las posibilidades y problemas que representa la extensión territorial de la democracia dentro del contexto del creciente interés en asuntos sobre democracia y descentralización en Latinoamerica. En ambos casos se enfatiza el nivel regional y se contrasta la regionalización "desde arriba" en el caso Chileno y las presiones "desde abajo" en el establecimiento de gobiernos regionales en el caso Boliviano. [end p. 65]