ABSTRACT
The demise of the former Soviet Union and its traditional markets has placed the Cuban economy on a perilous search for hard currency. Tourism provides a ready source of foreign exchange. Cuba's market niche in the Caribbean tourist industry draws on ecotourism, health tourism, academic tourism, and the traditional "sun-and-surf" venue. This paper first situates Cuba's new position in the global economy in a post-Soviet era. Next, it describes four sub-components of the tourist industry, emphasizing the legal and ideological context of these new markets. Finally, the paper addresses how Cuba's hybrid, yet timid market-driven tourist sector accommodates the mandates of a centrally-planned economy with a growing private sector.

INTRODUCTION¹

Cuba in the Post-Soviet Era
Central planning in Cuba's socialist economy has aimed to address the nation's uneven development. This focus emphasized a "maximum of rural and a minimum of urban." Literacy campaigns, public health, public housing, and rural infrastructure consumed central planning from the 1960s until the 1980s. Like the Chinese development strategies during Mao Zedong's rule (1949-1976), cities represented elitism and the concentration of capital. In both pre-socialist Cuban and China, towns and cities represented the evils of capitalist development. Accordingly, both nations charted a planning course that emphasized those outside their nations' cities. This approach also led to relatively little contact with capitalist outsiders, as restrictions on tourism accompanied this new development paradigm.

Unlike the Chinese, the Cubans had few natural resources beyond agriculture (sugar and tobacco) and some minor mineral reserves (nickel). Therefore, revolutionary Cuba (post-1959) participated in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)² until the late 1980s, which gave Cuba and North Korea preferential trade terms. Cuba could count on the CMEA, and especially the USSR, to purchase more than half of its sugar crop at above market prices. Even one ton of sugar could be exchanged for an equal amount of petroleum from the USSR. As the Soviet system unraveled in the 1980s, Cuba bartered for oil at an unfavorable 2: 1 ratio. Economic assistance from the CMEA totaled US$6 billion in 1989, which raised Cuba's total national debt to US$24 billion. By 1990, both the USSR and the CMEA had ceased to exist and, in that same year, the island's imports from the USSR fell by 70% (Zimbalist 1993: 408). Ships from CMEA nations used to carry a large amount of merchandise at low or subsidized costs for Cuba. By the mid-1990s, however, Eastern European and Russian vessels began requiring hard currency for shipping Cuban merchandise (Mesa-Lago 1994). Moreover, between 1989 and 1995, Cuban imports fell by about two-thirds (Figure 1), underscoring the difficulty inherent in what the Cuban government has labeled the "Special Period in the Time of Peace."

Without foreign subsidizes, guaranteed favorable prices, and an Eastern European market no longer in place, the revolutionary leadership sought new ways to generate hard currency. In addition, power outages, bus-route cancellations, and work slow-downs (because of no inputs or energy sources) made it difficult to introduce new market reforms. On the 40th anniversary of the 26 July, 1953, attack by Fidel Castro and his comrades against the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba, the Líder Máximo [end p. 97] announced radical reforms: legalization of the dollar, more than 100 new private-sector jobs, checking and saving accounts in dollars, limited but unrestricted agricultural markets, and a greater emphasis on joint ventures (empresas mixtas). Tourism has benefitted from these measures because of its multiple services (tour guides, drivers, cleaning staff), and particularly because of the ability of informal-sector workers to enter the dollar economy. At a broader level, Castro's speech marked a strong call for more joint ventures along the lines that had been evolving since the late 1980s (Carranza et al. 1995; Figueras 1994). As of March 1998, 322 foreign enterprises were working with Cuban counterparts. Three-quarters of those joint ventures are concentrated in six sectors of the economy: basic industry, tourism, light industry, food and food services, construction, and agriculture (CubaNews 1998).

This paper examines the changing nature of post-Soviet Cuba as demonstrated in the tourist sector. It begins by situating Cuba in the global economy since the demise of the former Soviet Union and its trading bloc. Next, it highlights four aspects of the tourist industry, emphasizing the legal and ideological spaces in which these tourist markets function. It concludes with an exploration of how Cuba's new market-driven tourist economy melds with the mandates of a larger centrally-planned economy. Cuba's current emphasis on tourism is similar to that of the 1950s, except that today it is more geographically dispersed and diversified.

THE FACES OF CUBAN TOURISM
The city of Havana (1998 population, 2.2 million) holds several comparative advantages in the South Florida and Caribbean tourist markets. Traditionally, Havana has always offered low costs for tourists. Multiplier effects in the 1950s generated by tourism shared common features with tourism in other Caribbean nations. Rum and tobacco sales, as well as a broad range of artisan industries, benefitted from the tourist trade. Most of the tourist infrastructure was foreign owned in the 1950s, whereas nationalization of tourist facilities ensued after 1961. Although joint ventures in Revolutionary Cuba have been permitted since Law Decree No. 50 was enacted in 1982, it was not until the 1990s that large-scale joint ventures surfaced on the island (Espino 1993). The development of newer tourist facilities coupled with aggressive promotion--especially in Canada and Western Europe--resulted in a dramatic influx of tourists (Figure 2). Between 1985 and 1997, the number of visitors rose almost five-fold from 250,000 to just over 1.2 million. In 1996, Italians, Canadians, Spaniards, and Germans constituted just over half of all tourists (Figure 3).

Sun-and-Surf: A Benign Climate
Locational features of site and situation have also dealt the island comparative advantages. Although Havana has a lower latitude than Florida, the Trade Winds produce slightly cooler temperatures in Havana during the summer. In the wintertime, its insular location and a strong maritime influence make it slightly warmer than in Florida (Table 1). Proximity [end p. 98] to the largest and most affluent international tourist market in the world has not been lost on Cuban governments throughout the 20th century.

For many years, Havana's standard tourist fare has been colonial Havana, tourism oriented around the accomplishments of the revolution, twentieth-century architecture, the Tropicana Nightclub, and the beaches of Habana del Este. Cuban tourism has always figured prominently as a source for generating foreign currency. Marrero (1981a: 316) reported that Cuban tourism grossed US$107 million between 1954-56, the third most important source of national wealth after sugar and tobacco. During pre-Revolutionary times, Havana performed as one point in a circuit of North American tourist flows, along with Las Vegas and Miami. Hotel ownership and gambling operations among the three points were closely coordinated. Short trips across the Straits of Florida by airplane and boat were especially common allures in the Miami-Key West-Havana circuit. During the peak years of international tourism between Miami and Cuba, hourly scheduled flights operated between dawn and midnight. In the mid-1950s, an average of 260,000 tourists visited Cuba [end p. 99] annually, with Havana the main destination (Marrero 1981a). As discussed below, this figure fell rapidly during the first two decades of the Revolution. Comparable levels would not appear until the onset of the economic crisis brought on by the dissolution of the USSR in 1989.

Cycles of Tourism
The Revolution and the imminent disruption of diplomatic and trade relations with the United States curtailed international tourism in Cuba. In 1957 304,711 tourists visited Cuba. It would take nearly 20 years for this number to approach pre-Revolutionary levels. Between 1960-1975, international tourism practically disappeared in Cuba because the Revolutionary government discouraged it. Revolutionary leaders considered tourism too closely aligned with the capitalist sins of prostitution, drugs, crime, and gambling. However, in 1976 the government created the National Institute of Tourism (INTUR). As a result, international tourism rose from a mere 8,400 visitors in 1974 to 69,500 in 1978 (Espino 1993). Relative growth of Cuba's tourist trade quickened in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s. The number of international visitors to Cuba in the 1980s increased at an average annual rate of 9.4 percent, greater than the Caribbean's rate as a whole. However, in 1988, Cuba had attracted only 3.2 percent of all Caribbean tourist arrivals and had earned only 2.1 percent of the region's tourist receipts (Espino 1991). Approximately 340,000 tourists visited the island in 1990, while 619,000 visited in 1994, an increase of 82 percent.

A strong infusion of Spanish capital and joint ventures has bolstered the island's hotel room capacity. Some of the most recent and notable hotel and tourist complexes include the Meliá Las Américas in Varadero and the Meliá Cohiba in the Vedado district of Havana. Although tourism holds great promise for the island and its capital city, the net earnings are slim. In 1992, an estimated US$400 million in gross revenues yielded just US$240 million in net revenues. This amounted to just one percent of the Gross Social Product (GSP).³ Another obstacle is the relatively low rate of repeat tourism; only 7 or 8 percent of tourists return to Cuba, versus 20 percent elsewhere in the Caribbean. One analyst finds that Cuba attracts tourists who spend very little beyond the already low-cost vacation packages. In addition, the multipliers are few because of the high rate of imports in the tourist industry (Mesa-Lago 1994: 19).

Repeat tourism would be key to Havana's success should the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba be lifted and after the first wave of curiosity seekers passes through the city's streets. Once a tropical destination is 'discovered' and promoted appropriately, the allure to such a place should creat a tourist flow with its own momentum (Stough and Feldman 1984). In truth, there are an unlimited number of sun, sand, and sea destinations for the North American and European markets (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1992). Although Cuba had an advantage as a get-away spot for U. S. tourists, and had cultivated experience among tourist industry personnel in the international tourist trade, all that vanished with the strengthening of the Revolution and the trade embargo. Human capital was also lost, especially knowledge transferred among generations of tourirm workers and business managers.

As Cuba transitions from a fairle 'closed' island to an 'open' one, the surge of tourists poses problems.Host population responses to major tourist influxes elsewhere have ranged from outright hostility to overt emphoria (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1992). The 'mindset' of many Cuban tourism employees must change so that cordiality and attentiveness create repeat tourism. Furthermore, Cuba's development of the U.S. market would require a special adaptation of its current tourism infrastructure. As de Albuquerque and McElroy note (1992: 626): "Because of the middle-class Americans penchant for the familiar, this strong U.S. influence in the Caribbean tourist industry is partly responsible for the observed preference for hotel lodging and the relatively large-scale facilities and shorter stays characteristic of mature destinations." By "mature" destinations the authors refer to the islands with the highest visitor per-capita spending in Caribbean nations with fewer than half a million inhabitants (Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Curaç ao, St. Maarten, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).

Havana maintains its position as the major tourist destination within Cuba. According to a recent United-Nations sponsored publication (Business Tips on Cuba 1994), Havana operates ata a 76 percent room capacity, compared with 94 percent in Holguin, 93 percent in Santiago de Cuba, 62 percent in Varadero, and 75 percent in the other tourist zones of Cuba. Thus, while the Cuban government seeks to expand its tourist infrastructure throughout the island, and nt just in Havana, eastern Cuba (Holguin and Santiago) approaches maximum capacity, while the Havana-Varadero tourist poles still have room for growth. The relative rate of growth in hotel rooms is greatest outside Havana (Figure 4). [end p. 100]

International tourism in Cuba builds on the attraction afforded by both Havana and the Revolution. There are 174 travel agencies outside Cuba and 38 agencies within Cuba to handle this travel. While Havana is the primary destination, the entire island boasts seven international airports and enlists three Cuban and 35 foreign airlines to handle tourist arrivals (Business Tips on Cuba 1994). Western Europe is the largest regional contributor to Cuba's international tourist flow (see Figure 3). Most Canadians arrive in charter flights departing from the eastern Canadian provinces, and book week-long packages. Varadero's airport, Juan Gualberto Gómez International, is 140 kms. east of Havana, or 90 minutes by road. Its 60-80 by 3,000 meter (195-260 by 9,840 ft.) runway can handle the arrival of large aircraft (CubaNews 1993). Day trips into Havana are common parts of the 'ground packages' provided by these flights.

The corporate arrangement of tourist and related services is unique. A listing of the subsidiaries of one large state-owned company (Cimex, S.A.) reveals its operations in both tourist and non-tourist related activities (Table 2). Because state agencies and joint ventures do not publish annual reports, the logic behind the organization of Cimex is unclear. Cimex is a "corporation authorized to carry out financial trade operations in connection with the tourist industry, development assistance and project design" (Havanatur 1992: 7). Not surprisingly, most such companies have their major offices in Havana. At first glance, Cimex shows a vertical integration of firms that is common in the tourist industry. For example, its subsidiaries can sell airline tickets (Celimar), provide ground transportation (Havanatur), rent automobiles to foreign tourists (Havanautos), supply tourists with souvenirs (Souvenirs Cimex), and supply beverages at Cuban tourist facilities (Tropicola). However, it is involved in seemingly unrelated activities in the area of movie rentals (World Services Publications) and software design (Sociedad Datacimex). Other unconventional organizations work in the tourist industry, which I address in the following section. [end p. 101]

MILITARY MANAGEMENT AND THE NEW TOURISM
If the shift away from the Soviet Union in a post-Cold War era has challenged Cuba, nowhere has this change been more striking than in the role of the island's armed forces. Long gone are the days of armed struggle in Angola and Mozambique. Cuba indeed has been cashing in on this 'peace dividend' even though it has the second largest army in Latin America after Brazil. The Cuban military had worked in endeavors outside civil defense well before the onset of the Special Period. Its presence in tourism is strong and growing. Not unlike the military rulers under Pinochet's Chile, who brought modem management techniques to social services, Cuba's military personnel have transferred their special training to earning hard currency. Unlike military rule in Pinochet's Chile, though, Cuba's armed forces (FAR, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias) have been working closely with Chinese military officers. Even though Cuba and China have signed high-tech military assistance agreements, the bilateral relations focus on modernization and economic reform. Fidel Castro rejects some of the economic reforms in China--namely the unleashing of a large sector of self-employed workers--but insists that the Chinese military model will serve as inspiration for the Cuban military, especially as the armed forces increase their role in the Cuban economy (Amuchástegui 1997).

Gaviota (literally, 'seagull') is the best-known enterprise of the armed forces. It gained experience in managing recreational centers for Soviet advisors back in the 1960s. That marked the beginning of what has become a multi-faceted presence in Cuba's tourist trade. Gaviota now operates bus tours, marinas, spas, hunting preserves, fishing excursions, and luxury hotels. It also boasts a large fleet of taxis and an airline. Gaviota pursues horizontal linkages. It taps into tourists' expendable income through the TRD Caribe chain of department stores, another enterprise [end p. 102] run by the armed forces (Figure 5). TRD stands for tiendas de recaudación de divisas (foreign-currency collection stores), symbolizing the goals of all state activities in tourism. Cuba's armed forces have been downsized by some 25 percent (from a maximum of 200,000 men and women during its involvement in Africa in the 1980s). Entering the market, though, has brought problems from which even the Armed Forces are not immune: nepotism and corruption. Despite these problems, the army has produced a well-disciplined cadre of engineers, agronomists and technicians. In the words of economist Julio Carranza, former deputy director of the Center for the Study of the Americas in Havana: "The armed forces are trying to generate foreign exchange so as to be able to sustain themselves as a military force without being a load on the state or a burden on the rest of the economy" (Rohter 1996: 18).

Ecotourism and Island Paradise
Havana's metropolitan area of 2.2 million residents holds little ecological allure for ecotourism travelers. Although its population density is one of the lowest of all Latin American capitals, and it holds about ten square meters of park and green space per resident, it is not an ecological haven (GDIC 1991). Unfortunately, the Bay of Havana is one of the most contaminated bodies of water in the Caribbean (Collis 1995). Nonetheless, those in search of ecotourist experiences usually pass through Havana, which, in turn, generates multipliers for the Havana tourist market. Fishing, hunting, diving, and bird watching side-trips leave Havana regularly and include tourists who come to Cuba chiefly to experience the capital city. Ecotourism in Cuba, though, has developed slowly (Collis 1995). Six locations on the island are under consideration for ecotourism development: Sierra Maestra, Guanahacabibes, Pinares de Mayarí, Sierra del Rosario, Tope de Collantes, and Ciénaga de Zapata (Figure 6). One of the closest ecotourist resorts to Havana is at Las Terrazas, about two hours outside the capital. An ecotourist facility opened in 1994 next to a 'new town' that was built in the 1960s. [end p. 103]

Tourists can see some of the island's most varied flora and fauna at Las Terrazas (Urban Design 1995)

At present, it is unclear whether Cuba's search for hard currency will allow for a gradual development of these areas. Cuba's ecotourism appeal will draw on the largest collection of flora and fauna in the Caribbean. These sights will provide' light recreation' such as hiking, boating, camping, photography and wildlife watching. Although not high on the hard-currency generating scale, they could provide revenue for environmental trusts to protect some of the island's most coveted natural areas. At the same time, however, the increase in hotels and tourists also endangers many habitats.

Health Tourism
Principles of equal access to services, an integral approach to health care, and popular participation in health initiatives guide Cuba's health system (Feinsilver 1993: 28). Cuba has generously provided physician services and medical care to developing countries in Africa and Asia. It also provides specialized high-tech medical procedures such as cardiac surgery, eye surgery, and cancer treatment at lower costs than those found in the United States, Europe, or elsewhere in Latin America.

Cuba's renowned system of health care also is available to foreigners, provided they purchase services in hard currency. Havana is home to several international tourist hospitals in the Vedado, Miramar, and Centro Habana districts of the city. These facilities provide acute, tertiary care services. Foreigners unable to pay for certain specialized care are also treated on an availability basis for specialized services. For example, Frank País Hospital offers rehabilitation services for war casualties from Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the former Soviet Union. Orthopedic surgical procedures and revascularization of the spinal cord procedures can also be secured there at a fraction of the cost in most advanced industrial counties (Feinsilver 1993: 72).

Cuba also promotes other specialized medical procedures under the label turismo de salud. A number of small clinics cater largely to foreigners who seek out medical procedures that either do not exist in their country, are too expensive there, or have not been approved (i.e., by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration). These include the Center for Placental Histotherapy, Center for Medical Surgical Research, Cardiology and Cardiovascular Surgery Institute, Gastroenterology Institute, and the Sports Medicine Institute, among others. Foreigners can book complete package tours. Prices include air fare, lodging, ground transportation, nursing and medical care, specified medication and surgical procedures, and designated laboratory work. Patients from the United States can come through third countries (Bahamas, Mexico, Canada, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica).

Even though the use of human placenta materials for treatment is illegal in the United States, the Center for Placental Histotherapy has established [end p. 104] a track record of evening out skin coloring among thousands of patients. Cuban physicians and researchers claim the U.S. embargo and transnational pharmaceutical corporations exert so much pressure that it is difficult to sell Cuban pharmaceutical and biotechnical products outside Cuba. Dr. Carlos Miyares Cao (1995), General Director of the Center of Placenta Histotherapy, claims that even foreign medical journals in allegedly 'sympathetic' countries like Mexico succumb to pressure about publishing the clinical results of Cuban researchers.

Academic and Cultural Tourism
Revolutionary Cuba, with its microbrigades of volunteers, sugar-harvest (zafra) campaigns, and international linkages with groups in solidarity with Cuba, receives an undetermined number of 'tourists' who do not visit the island for sun and sand. U.S. citizens, except for journalists, academic researchers and students, are forbidden from visiting the island because of travel restrictions imposed by the United States Treasury Department. U.S. citizens who do not qualify as journalists or researchers come out of curiosity or else are ardent supporters of the Cuban Revolution. Marazul Travel and the Center for Cuban Studies promote political and cultural trips to Havana. Global Exchange in San Francisco has organized large-scale trips to the island to observe the social experiment there and to donate food, clothing and medicine. These visits generate small amounts of hard currency, medicine, and clothing. Symbolically, though, they focus international attention on the human dimension of the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. For example, Fidel Castro frequently uses the analogy of David and Goliath and contrasts the geographic, economic and political powers of the United States with his small homeland.

Afro-Cuban culture also attracts thousands to the island, and Cubancan, INTUR and other state agenncies promote trips that focus on santería, the island's African-Catholic belief system. Santeros and babalaos (priests and priestesses) will meet with tourists to explain the role of deities (orishas) that blend Yoruba and Roman Catholic symbols. Musical presentations drawing heavily on rumba and other rhythmic interludes make up another important segment of Cuba's 'cultural tourism.' This is, however, a highly specialized form of tourism. It can easily be accessed in Havana as a primary or complementary activity to the city's many cultural and physical amenities.

IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF TOURISM AND PLANNING
Planning in Revolutionary Cuba began in 1962 and was originally confmed to land-use planning and public service delivery. As noted above, it did not include tourism as a focus. Rather, central planning tackled the problems of literacy, public housing, and rural infrastructure. The brief survey of planning in Cuba that follows serves as a mirror to prevailing political and economic goals in post-1959 Cuba. As is shown, tourism and planning have been closely joined only during the past decade.

The Institute of Physical Planning and its staff of engineers, architects, geographers, and planners directed the construction of the 'Havana Greenbelt' (El Cordón de La Habana), an agricultural buffer zone surrounding the capital designed to curtail urban sprawl and establish intensive truck farming to feed habaneros. Although the greenbelt never achieved its goals, it allowed the concept of urban and regional planning to find its way into the Popular Powers (Poderes Populares) units of government that were established in 1977. These new local governance systems housed planning departments in various provincial cities (García Pleyan 1986; Segre et al. 1997). Planning in Revolutionary Cuba shows that the interests of ministerial and Cuban Communist Party leaders overshadow the recommendations and even ordinances stipulated by land-use plans. Indeed, Havana City Province drafted its own master plans (Table 3) in order to address the needs of its 2.2 million residents.

These master plans had relied on a stable economy derived mainly from favorable trade with CMEA and development aid from the USSR. These conditions of development were not sustainable, and planning shifted its focus to accommodate these structural changes. One outcome of the collapse of this unsustainable development model is the search for hard currency and limited market reforms. Earning hard currency is seen as a stopgap measure in arresting the island's downward economic spiral. Fidel Castro (1995) contends that these new market reforms are necessary evils in the Cuban transition to socialism. Although physical planning is not directly associated with tourism, economic development plannning forms a key part of Cuban tourism. 'Physical planning,' as it is known in Cuba, involves five-year plans that began in the early days of the Revolution [end p. 105] and resemble the Soviet and Chinese models. These are macro-economic maps that chart out priorities in investment and expenditure. The siting of services, factories, schools, and related land uses, however, is the business of urban and regional planners.

The case of the new Hotel Meliá Cohiba in Havana highlights planning's subordinate role to more powerful government agencies. The hotel is located on the Malecón seaside promenade, the major east-west axis for road travel between the old city (Habana Vieja) and Miramar (the bourgeoisie suburrban neighborhood before 1959). The 'heart' of this eight-kilometer stretch runs through Vedado, which is the central tourist district in Havana. The Malecón is also the major 'village green' for Havana: its citizens gather along its sidewalk for recreation, socializing, fishing, strolling, dancing, and other activities. The Meliá Cohíba sits next to the Hotel Riviera, a classic modern structure built in the 1950s when Cuba functioned as a cornerstone in the Las Vegas-Miami-Havana triangle of tourism. The 22-floor Meliá looms over a neighborhood built during the first decades of this century. Not only does its aluminum and glass-wrapped exterior clash with the built fabric surrounding it (i.e., the modernist Hotel Riviera and the Republican-era Hotel Presidente from the 1920s), but also it is flood-lit in a blue-metallic glare that seems almost ghoulish. Nightly, scores of hustlers (macetas, or Havana's noveau riche hustlers), prostitutes (jineteras), and curious on-lookers gather outside, hoping a foreigner with hard currency will invite them inside the 400-plus room facility.

During the planning phase of this Cuban-Spanish project, a group of planners and architects at the Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (a think-tank devoted to Havana's urban design, planning, and community development) designed a scaled model of the Meliá project. The Grupo houses the second largest architectural model in the world: a faithful replica of Havana's core at a 1: 1,000 scale. Their scaled model of the proposed hotel revealed an obvious disruption of the city's skyline. However, the Grupo was never consulted. Instead, the Minister of Tourism and probably President Fidel Castro approved the project.

The Meliá carries brand-name recognition among Europeans and Latin Americans. This likely proved to be very attractive for the Cuban governnment. Construction of the hotel shares similarities with urban planning in Cuba in the 1950s. Both periods show how urban development projects can get 'pushed through' by sidestepping assessments by professional planners. In that regard, planning in Revolutionary Cuba has become subordinate to the same monetary forces that guided urban planning before the Revolution.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Private enterprise and non-state sources of capital are redirecting planning in Cuba. On the one hand, entrepreneurs in Cuba receive mixed messages [end p. 106] from the State. On the other hand, Castro frequently rails against the evils of capitalism, but is wedded to courting the international business community, including Turner Broadcasting magnate Ted Turner and the former chairman of Chrysler Motors Corporation, Lee Iacoco. As the Meliá Hotel example shows, technical advice from planners, lawyers, architects, and geographers does not carry nearly as much clout as political will among party leaders (Scarpaci 1996b). This does not mean that zoning and land-use regulations in market economies such as the United States are always respected (Palen 1995). What is surprising is that after 30 years of railing against the evils of the market, Cuba is avidly seeking foreign investment at almost any cost: architectural intrusion, reviving the old 'sins' of tourism from the 1950s, and more. There is little evidence that quality investment in the tourist sector is being attracted to Cuba (although the Meliá is among the more reputable). As one retired official in Cuba's armed forces told me: "If we are going to attract capitalists, why not bring in the best? Instead, we find second and even third-rate capitalists at our doorstep" (Personal communication 1993).

Although the data are sketchy, appointments to represent Cuban interests (outside the military-run firms) often have little experience with commerce and retailing. Political favoritism, nepotism, and cronyism in Cuba (an old-boy network called 'sociolismo' by Leon 1995) enter into management decision-making. For instance, it is still common to find veterans of wars in Angola and Mozambique assigned to new joint-venture schemes, while their only managerial experience has been confined to money-losing state enterprises. Their only 'credit' is their service and dedication to the Revolution. What Cuban managers in the tourist industry sorely need, it would seem, is a crash course in Entrepreneurship 101!

Nurturing the private sector is also a problem among micro-enterprises. After Fidel Castro's now famous 26 July 1993 speech, in which he sanctioned more than 100 private-sector jobs, a flurry of restaurants opened 'officially,' even though they had operated clandestinely as speak-easys. But in February 1994, more than 100 of these restaurants (paladares) in Havana were raided by police (Scarpaci 1996a). Allegedly, they were guilty of tax and license evasion, selling stolen food, or other infractions. My interviews with twelve paladar operators provided different information: all had licenses and were operating legally. The police confiscated food, drink, tables and chairs, stereo equipment, and other provisions from these fledgling home restaurants. Soon thereafter, Fidel once again denounced the 'illicit enrichment' of these new entrepreneurs. Within a few weeks, almost all of the paladares were back in operation. The unspoken message of the police raid is that if you make money, you should not flaunt your success.

Tourism and planning in post-Soviet Cuba have now created a new hybrid of economic development. Planning in Cuba has as much to do with business as it does with land-use and zoning. Cuba is far from the 1950s top-down Stalinist models of the USSR and hardly a Latin American NIC (Newly Industrializing Country), yet its planning plods along an uncharted course. To be sure, the economy of the late 1990s is stronger than in 1993, but there is no recipe for transitioning suddenly from Soviet support to a harsh, rapid insertion into the global market. Furthermore, the persistent U.S. embargo has extended a wider web in the form of the Helms-Burton Act to try and discourage third-nation countries from conducting business with Cuba.

Planning decisions at the local level are now subordinate to a new actor in the decision-making arena: foreign capital. Although the 50-50 partnership rule still makes the Cuban government a key player in the island's new tourist ventures, one cannot help but wonder about the sudden marriage between communists and capitalists. While new tourist revenues have arrested serious economic deterioration, change for the average Cuban has been slow. Access to basic consumer durables requires a friend, contact, socio, or relative abroad who can remit dollars. If planning in the 1950s was perennially plagued by a lack of data and unquantifiable backroom deals and lobbyists, the contemporary setting in Cuba is even more complex. On the one hand, entrepreneurship is seen as a necessary evil while, on the other, flaunting this new wealth is anti-Revolutionary. As the Cuban leadership clings to an ambiguous perception of what 'real socialism' entails, life on the streets remains hard and confusing.

Tourism and planning are new partners in the course of four decades of socialist government. The traditional foci on rural infrastructure, public housing, health and education changed with the collapse of the USSR. Although tourism provides a quick means of generating hard currency, it draws on a comparative advantage that Cuba had in the 1950s, but was not pursued for reasons identified above. Hotel room construction remains concentrated in Varadero and La Habana, but the rate of relative increase is greater along Cuba's once-pristine northern shores. Joint-ventures and the growing role of the armed forces now serve as the new tourist planning medium for [end p. 107] generating hard currency. Having embarked on a new hybrid model of central planning, this overture to the international market does not mean, in the words of Fidel Castro, that there will be "a transition to capitalism" (Granma Internacional 1998: 3). Rather, the State will continue to dominate tourism planning as it aims to reorganize both the economy and new spaces for leisure activities.

NOTES
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Charlotte, North Carolina, April 10, 1996. The author wishes to thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.

2. This was a trade organization that consisted of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. At various times until its demise in the late 1980s, it also included non-contiguous nations such as Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. Preferential terms of trade benefitted the less developed country members. A complex list of products, services, and trade agreements sought to establish commercial links among nations who sought to counter the perceived political and economic hegemony imposed by non-socialist countries.

3. The Gross Social Product was used by members of the Soviet bloc and measured the total production of goods and services consumed within a nation. It is similar to the Gross Domestic Product but the figures are not directly comparable.

4. The circulation of hard currency in Cuba has become ingrained quickly. Before 1993, possessing dollars was illegal. Those persons holding or safeguarding dollars were called maceteros, because it was said they would hide dollars in flower pots (macetas). Today, Cubans use at least eight names for dollars: fula, guano, guaniquiqu, varo, peso, verde, billetes largos, chavitos (coins), as well as the official terms for hard currency and foreign exchange: divisas and dólares. There is now great demand for marketing, M.B.A., and English classes. For an insightful review see Ojito (1998).

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RESUMEN
La disolución de la Unión Soviética y sus mereados tradicionales Ie ha colocado la economía cubana en una búsqueda difícil para divisas. El turismo ofrece una fuente segura de moneda en divisas. El papel de Cuba en el turismo del Caribe cuenta con el ecoturismo, turismo de salud, turismo académico, y el aspecto tradicional de 'sol y playa.' Este ensayo primeramente analiza la posición de Cuba en una economía global pos-soviética. Luego, se describe los cuatro componentes del turismo cubano, dando énfasis a los espacios juridícos e ideológicos en los cuales estos nuevos mercados funcionan. Finalmente, la presentación investiga como el híbrido sector turístico, aunque es impulsado por el mercado, puede acomodarse tanto a los mandatos de una economía centralmente planificada como a un sector privado en crecimiento. [end p. 109]